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It is well known that the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), the IETF standard inter-domain
routing protocol, is vulnerable to a variety of attacks, and that a single misconﬁgured or malicious
BGP speaker could result in large scale service disruption. In this paper, we present Pretty Secure
BGP (psBGP) – a proposal for securing BGP, including an architectural overview, design details
for signiﬁcant aspects, and preliminary security and operational analysis. psBGP diﬀers from
other security proposals (e.g., S-BGP and soBGP) in that it makes use of a single-level PKI for
AS number authentication, a decentralized trust model for verifying the propriety of IP preﬁx
origin, and a rating-based stepwise approach for AS PATH (integrity) veriﬁcation. psBGP trades
oﬀ the strong security guarantees of S-BGP for presumed-simpler operation, e.g., using a PKI
with a simple structure, with a small number of certiﬁcate types, and of manageable size. psBGP
is designed to successfully defend against various (non-malicious and malicious) threats from
uncoordinated BGP speakers, and to be incrementally deployed with incremental beneﬁts.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: C.2.6 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Internetworking—Security
General Terms: Inter-domain Routing, Security
Additional Key Words and Phrases: BGP, Trust, Routing Security, Secure Routing Protocols
1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
The Internet routing infrastructure consists of a number of Autonomous Systems (ASes),
each of which consists of a number of routers under a single technical administration (e.g.,
sharing the same routing policy). The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [Rekhter and Li
1995] is the IETF standard inter-domain routing protocol for exchanging reachability in-
formationbetween ASes on the Internet. Each network layer destination is identiﬁed by an
IP preﬁx representing a range of IP addresses. An AS announcesits IP preﬁxes via BGP to
its direct neighbors, which may further propagate the preﬁx announcement to their neigh-
bors. A remote AS receiving such announcement may build routes for forwarding trafﬁc
destined to the addresses within the address range speciﬁed by the announced preﬁxes.
One critical question with BGP is the following: which AS has a right to announce a
given IP preﬁx? The current version of BGP does not have any mechanism to verify the
propriety of IP preﬁx origin, i.e., if the originating AS indeed holds a preﬁx (allocated) or
it is authorized by the actual holder of the preﬁx (delegated). This opens a serious secu-
rity hole which allows one AS to announce IP preﬁxes allocated or delegated (hereafter
assigned) to any other ASes. This is commonly referred to as preﬁx hijacking. Examples
of consequences include denial of service (i.e., legitimate user trafﬁc cannot get to its ul-
timate destination) and man-in-the-middleattacks (i.e., legitimate user trafﬁc is forwarded
Toappear in ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC). Prelimimary versions of this work
appeared as [Wan et al. 2005] and [Wan 2006]. The second author is currently with Nortel, Canada.
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through a router under the control of an adversary). Warnings about attacks exploiting
routing vulnerabilities were given circa 1988 by Perlman [1988], and by Bellovin [1989];
and such attacks have recently reportedly been carried out by spammers [Bellovin 2004].
Many proposals [Kent et al. 2000; Goodell et al. 2003; White 2003; Aiello et al. 2003]
have been made for improving BGP security, and in particular, for verifying if an AS
has the right to announce a given IP preﬁx. There are two main approaches: 1) building
centralized routing registries storing information about address space assignments, e.g.,
the Internet Routing Registry (IRR) [IRR 2005], to facilitate the containmentof fraudulent
route announcements, e.g., by ﬁltering; and 2) building a strict hierarchical public key
infrastructure(PKI) in parallel to the existing IP address assignment structure(e.g., S-BGP
[Seo et al. 2001; Lynn et al. 2003]). While these two approaches may differ in many ways,
e.g., protecting a database itself vs. protecting individual objects in the database, they both
typically require a large scale PKI to provide strong security or to meet some operational
requirements (e.g., multi-homing).
IRR needs to perform identity authentication to verify if an entity requesting to make
changes to the routing database is authorized to do so. Currently in IRR, PGP [Zimmer-
mann 1995] is used for public key authentication. However, this authentication is done
using a sender’s email address when an object is ﬁrst created, and thus is vulnerable to
email spooﬁng[Zsako 1999]. As a result, a global PKI or something equivalent,appears to
be required to provide stronger guarantees. More seriously, there are no controls in place
to ensure that the information asserted by a user is accurate, even though the user can be
authenticated. S-BGP makes use of a hierarchical tree structure for address assignment,
rooted at Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). For each consecutive pair of nodes on the
address assignment chain, the ﬁrst node (an organization) on the chain assigns a subset of
its ownaddressspacetothesecond. Whileanorganizationobtainingits addressspacefrom
its Internet Service Providers(ISPs) may not needto appearon an address delegationchain
(i.e., need not be issued relevant certiﬁcates), it will need a certiﬁcate to do multi-homing
(i.e., connecting to two independent ISPs) or to connect to another ISP different from the
one it obtained the address space from. Since these common operational practices must
be supported [Villamizar et al. 1999], it implies that many organizations not running BGP
may also need to be involved in the S-BGP PKI, resulting in the challenging requirement
of a large scale (essentially global) PKI. In addition, it appears difﬁcult to build a central-
ized PKI for verifying IP address assignment given the complexity, if not impossibility, of
tracing how the existing IP address space is assigned, and tracing all changes of IP address
assignments. This is in part due to the large number of preﬁxes in use, and the large num-
ber of organizations involved. Particularly, many IP addresses were given out before the
existing hierarchical address allocation structures were in place. Therefore, it might not
be possible to construct address assignment chains for them [DHS 2005]. Fundamentally,
all these approaches assume trusted authoritative sources of all preﬁx assignments. We
suggest that such an assumption might not be realistic, or at least it requires a large scale
infrastructure to support, which appears difﬁcult to realize.
CONTRIBUTIONS. In this paper, we present a new BGP security proposal – Pretty Se-
cure BGP (psBGP), based on our preliminary overviews [Wan et al. 2005; Wan 2006].
psBGP includes defenses against falsiﬁcation of BGP UPDATE messages, and a new ap-
proach for verifying the propriety of preﬁx origin by cross checking information from
multiple, ideally independent, sources. Speciﬁc psBGP security goals are outlined in §2.3.
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psBGP is based on the following assumptions: 1) trusted authorities of preﬁx assignments
on the Internet may not always be available; 2) some entities may have partial knowl-
edge of preﬁx assignments; and 3) corroboration of information from different sources
can increase conﬁdence in the assessment of that information. In particular, RIRs are the
trusted authority of initial preﬁx allocations, and some ASes might have partial knowledge
of preﬁx assignments of their direct neighbors. We note that while psBGP makes use of
corroboration for increasing conﬁdence in preﬁx assertions, it does not prevent the use of
a centralized PKI for preﬁx delegations. If such an infrastructure (e.g., [Kent 2006]) or
part of it does exist, it can also be used by psBGP in constructing AS preﬁx graphs (see
§4.1), in which case the corroboration approach by psBGP can be used for authenticating
preﬁxes not accommodated by the centralized PKI, e.g., legacy address space.
PSBGP HIGHLIGHTS. The major architectural highlights of psBGP are as follows.
1) psBGP makes use of a centralized trust model for AS number authentication. Each
AS obtains a public key certiﬁcate from one of several trusted certiﬁcate authorities (i.e.,
RIRs), binding an AS number to a public key. We suggest that such a trust model provides
best possible authorization of AS number allocation and best possible authenticity of AS
public keys. Authentication is usually the ﬁrst step towards authorization. Without such a
guarantee,anattacker maybe able to impersonateanotherAS andthus be able to announce
preﬁxes assigned to the impersonated AS.
2) psBGP makes use of a rating mechanism for ﬂexibility in balancing security and
practicality in preﬁx origin and AS PATH veriﬁcation.
3) psBGP makes use of a decentralized trust model for verifying the propriety of IP
preﬁx assignment. Each AS periodically issues a digitally signed Preﬁx Assertion List
(PAL) consisting of a number of bindings of an AS number and (zero or more) IP preﬁxes,
one such binding for itself and one for each of its neighbors. An assertion made by an AS
si regardingits own preﬁxes (preﬁx assertion) lists all preﬁxes assigned to si. An assertion
made by si for a neighboring AS sj (preﬁx endorsement) may list all or a subset of the
preﬁxes assigned to sj. An AS preﬁx graph (see §4.3) is built independently by each AS
si based on the PALs which si has received from other ASes and si’s ratings of those
ASes. An AS preﬁx graph is then used for evaluating the trustworthiness and preference
of a preﬁx origin by an AS, in conjunction with its local conﬁgurable parameters (e.g., its
trust in those ASes involved in a preﬁx assertion, and trust thresholds). In this way, the
difﬁcult task of tracing IP address assignments is distributed across ASes on the Internet.
4) psBGP modiﬁes the S-BGP digital signature approach with a rating mechanism and
a stepwise approach for verifying AS PATH integrity. Each AS computes a weight for an
AS PATH based on ratings of the ASes digitally signing the path, and determines whether
or not to accept the path based on local parameters. This approach allows an upgrading
path to countering increased threats, as recommended in [Bellovin et al. 2005].
Our design is inspired by the referral model widely used in social society for increasing
conﬁdence in the truth of a piece of information when an authoritative source of truth re-
garding that information is not available.1 For example, a job applicant is usually required
to provide reference letters to allow cross checking the applicant statements on his quality
and background. A reference letter should be from an individual who has closely worked
with the applicant, e.g., a former supervisor. Similarly in psBGP, each AS should obtain
endorsement for its preﬁx assertions from some ASes which are likely to have, or likely
1In this sense (and regarding stepwise integrity – see §3.5), there is some similarity to IRV [Goodell et al. 2003].
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to be reliable sources for, knowledge of its preﬁx assignment, e.g., a direct neighbor with
which it has a business relationship. An AS choosing to endorse a preﬁx assertion made
by a neighboring AS should carry out some form of due diligence (or other means to in-
crease accountability) to increase conﬁdence in the correctness of that assertion, i.e., to
increase its own conﬁdence that the asserted preﬁx is indeed assigned to the asserting AS.
The security assurances of this aspect of psBGP are directly related to the quality of such
due diligence, which will impose extra work on BGP operators; this is the price to pay for
increased security.
Inadditiontothebeneﬁtsderivedfrombeingincrementallydeployable,psBGPislightweight
- it uses a PKI which has a simple structure, a small number of certiﬁcate types, and is of
manageable size, while remaining effective – it is designed to successfully defend against
selected threats from uncoordinated, misconﬁgured or malicious BGP speakers.
ORGANIZATION. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. §2 deﬁnes notation,
overviews BGP, discusses BGP threats, and summarizes BGP security goals. psBGP is
presented in §3 and §4. Security and operational analysis of psBGP is given in §5 and §6
respectively. A brief review of related work is given in §7. We conclude in §8.
2. BACKGROUND: BGP SECURITY THREATS AND GOALS
After deﬁning notation, we give a brief overview of relevant aspects of BGP, discuss BGP
security threats, and summarize ﬁve security goals for BGP, for later use in the paper.
NOTATION. A and B denote entities (e.g., an AS or a BGP speaker). X or Y denotes an
assertion which is any statement. An assertion may be proper or improper. We avoid use
of the term true or false since in BGP, it is not always clear that a statement is 100% factual
or not. An assertion is proper if it conforms to the rules (e.g., psBGP rules) governing the
related entity making that assertion. Table I deﬁnes some of the notation used in this paper.
S,si S is the set of all AS numbers; currently S = {1,...,2
16}. si ∈ S is an AS number.
P,fi P is the set of all IP addresses. fi⊆P is an IP preﬁx specifying a range of IP addresses.
fi = fj∪fk if the IP addresses speciﬁed by fi equal those by fj and fk combined.
T an authority with respect to S and P, e.g., T ∈ {x|x is an RIR}.
pk pk = [s1,s2,...,sk] is an AS PATH; s1 is the ﬁrst AS inserted onto pk.
m m = (f1,pk) is a BGP route (a selected part of a BGP UPDATE message).
N(si) si’s neighbors, i.e., the set of ASes with which si establishes a BGP session on a regular
basis. A given AS si may have many BGP speakers, each of which may establish BGP
sessions with speakers from many other ASes. N(si) is the set of all other such ASes.
kA,kA A’s public and private keys, respectively.
{m}A digital signature on message m generated with A’s private key kA.
(kA,A)kB a public key certiﬁcate binding kA to A, signed using kB, veriﬁable using kB.
(fi,si)A an assertion made by A that fi is assigned to si.
Table I. Notation
2.1 Selective Overview of BGP
Conceptually,a routingnetworkcan beabstracted as a graph,wherea vertexis a routerand
an edge is a network link. If a network consists of a small (e.g., several) or medium (e.g.,
tens or hundreds) number of routers, and they are under a common administrative domain,
a single routing protocol can be used for exchanging and maintaining routing information
in that network. Since there are a large number of routers (e.g., exceeding hundreds of
Version: January 16, 2007.On Inter-domain Routing Security and Pretty Secure BGP (psBGP) · 5
thousands) on the Internet, and they are administrated by many different organizations, a
hierarchical routing approach has been chosen for better organizational and administrative
control and error containment, as well as scalability. Internet routing protocols can be
classiﬁed as intra-domain (used within an AS) or inter-domain (used between ASes).
BGP is an inter-domain routing protocol based on a distance vector approach. A BGP
speaker establishes a session over TCP with each of its direct neighbors, exchanges routes
with them, and builds routing tables based on the routing information received from them.
Unlike a simple distance vector routing protocol (e.g., RIP [Hedrick 1988]) where a route
has a simple metric (e.g., number of hops), a BGP route is associated with a number of
attributes and routes are selected based on local routing policy. One notable route attribute
is AS PATH, which consists of the sequence of ASes traversed by the route that is being
propagated. BGP is often considered a path vector routing protocol.
ASes on the Internet can be roughly classiﬁed into three categories: a stub-AS has only
one connection to other ASes; a multihomed-AS has more than one connection to other
ASes, but is not designed to carry trafﬁc for other ASes (e.g., for the purpose of load
balance or redundancy);and a transit-AS has more than one connection to other ASes, and
is designed to carry trafﬁc for others.
While a stub-AS may have only one BGP speaker, a multihomed or a transit-AS often
has more. A BGP session between two BGP speakers located within two different ASes is
often referred to as external-BGP (eBGP), and a BGP session between two BGP speakers
within a common AS is often referred to as internal-BGP (iBGP). An eBGP speaker ac-
tivelyexchangesroutinginformationwith an externalneighborby importingand exporting
BGP routes. An iBGP speakeronly helps propagateroutingupdatesto otherBGP speakers
within a common AS; it does not make any changes to a routing update.
A BGP session between two different ASes usually implies one of the following four
types of business relationship [Gao 2000]: customer-to-provider, provider-to-customer,
peer-to-peer, and sibling-to-sibling. A customer AS usually pays a provider AS for ac-
cessing the rest of the Internet. Two peer ASes usually ﬁnd it is mutually beneﬁcial to
allow each other to have access to their customers. Two sibling ASes are usually owned by
a common organization and allow each other to have access to the rest of the Internet.
2.2 Attacks on BGP
BGP faces attacks from both BGP speakers and BGP sessions. A misbehaving BGP
speaker may be misconﬁgured (mistakenly or intentionally), compromised (e.g., by ex-
ploiting software ﬂaws), or unauthorized (e.g., by exploiting a BGP peer authentication
vulnerability). A BGP session may be compromised or unauthorized. We focus on at-
tacks against BGP control messages without considering those against data trafﬁc (e.g.,
malicious packet dropping [Just et al. 2003]). Attacks against BGP control messages in-
clude, for example, modiﬁcation, insertion, deletion, exposure, and replaying of messages.
In this paper, we focus on modiﬁcation and insertion (hereafter falsiﬁcation [Barbir et al.
2004]) of BGP control messages; deletion, exposure and replaying can be addressed by a
point-to-point authentication protocol, e.g., IPsec [Kent and Atkinson 1998a].
There are four types of BGP control messages: OPEN, KEEPALIVE, NOTIFICATION,
and UPDATE. The ﬁrst three are used for establishing and maintaining BGP sessions with
peers, and falsiﬁcation of them will very likely result in session disruption. As mentioned
by Hu et al. [2004], they can be protected by IPsec [Kent and Atkinson 1998a]. In ps-
BGP, we concentrate on falsiﬁcation of BGP UPDATE messages (and hereafter, refrain
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from capitalizing UPDATE) which carry inter-domain routing information and are used
for building up routing tables.
A BGP update message consists of three parts: withdrawn routes, network layer reach-
ability information (NLRI), and path attributes (e.g., AS PATH, LOCAL PREF, etc.). As
commonlyagreed [Hu et al. 2004], a route should only be withdrawn by a party which had
previouslyannouncedthat route. Otherwise, a malicious entity could cause service disrup-
tion by withdrawing a route which is actually in service. Further discussion is beyond the
scope of the present paper.
NLRI consists ofa set of IP preﬁxessharingthe same characteristics, as describedbythe
path attributes. NLRI is falsiﬁed if an AS originatesa preﬁxneither heldby that AS nor au-
thorizedbytheholderofthat preﬁx,oraggregatedimproperlyfromotherroutes. Examples
of consequences include denial of service and man-in-the-middle attacks. There are two
types of AS PATH: AS SEQUENCE and AS SET. An AS PATH of type AS SEQUENCE
consists of an ordered list of ASes traversed by the route currently being propagated. An
AS PATH of type AS SET consists of an unordered list of ASes, sometimes created when
multiple routes are aggregated. An AS PATH is falsiﬁed if an AS or any other entity ille-
gally operates on an AS PATH, e.g., inserting a wrong AS number, deleting or modifying
an AS number on the path, etc. Since AS PATH is used for detecting routing loops and
used by route selection processes, falsiﬁcation of AS PATH can result in routing loops
or selecting routes not selected otherwise. Some other path attributes (e.g., community,
Multi Exit Disc, etc. [Rekhter and Li 1995]) may also need protection, but many of these
are usually only used between two neighbors and not globally transitive. Thus, damage
resulting from attacking them is relatively contained. In psBGP, we focus on countering
falsiﬁcation of NLRI and AS PATH which can result in large scale service disruption.
We assume there are multiple non-colluding misbehaving ASes (but see §4.2) in the
network, which may have their own legitimate cryptographic keying materials.
2.3 BGP Security Goals
We seek to design secure protocol extensions to BGP which can resist the threats as dis-
cussed above, i.e., primarily falsiﬁcation of BGP update messages. As with most other
secure communication protocols, BGP security goals must include data origin authenti-
cation and data integrity. In addition, veriﬁcation of the propriety of BGP messages is
required to resist falsiﬁcation attacks. Speciﬁcally, the propriety of NLRI and AS PATH
should be veriﬁed. All veriﬁcation will be performedmost likely by a BGP speaker online,
but possibly by an operator off-line, which is not discussed in the present paper.
We summarize ﬁve security goals for BGP (cf. [Kent et al. 2000], also see [Wan et al.
2005; Wan 2006]), for reference later in §3, §4, §5.1 and §7. G1 and G2 relate to data
origin authentication and are separated for the sake of clarity, G3 to data integrity, and
G4 and G5 to the propriety of BGP control messages. These ﬁve security goals address
a large number of serious attacks against BGP. Thus it is highly desirable for any serious
BGP security proposal to achieve them. However, these alone should not be considered
as sufﬁcient for BGP security, since other attacks (e.g., unauthorized route withdrawal)
remain (see §2.2).
G1. (AS Number Authorization) It must be veriﬁable that an entity using an AS number
si as its own is in fact an authorized representative of the AS to which a recognized AS
number authority assigned si.
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G2. (BGP Speaker Authorization) It must be veriﬁable that a BGP speaker, which asserts
an association with an AS number si, has been authorized by the AS to which si was
assigned by a recognized AS number authority.
G3. (DataIntegrity)It mustbeveriﬁablethat aBGP controlmessagehas notbeenillegally
modiﬁed in a point-to-point BGP session.
G4. (AS Path Veriﬁcation) It must be veriﬁable that an AS PATH (pk = [s1,s2,...,sk])
of a BGP route m being propagated consists of a sequence of ASes traversed by m in
the speciﬁed order, i.e., m originated from s1, and has traversed s2,...,sk in order.
G5. (Preﬁx Origin Authentication) It must be veriﬁable that it is proper for an AS to
originate an IP preﬁx. It is proper for AS s1 to originate preﬁx f1 if 1) f1 is indeed
held by s1 (preﬁx allocation); 2) s1 is authorized by the holder of f1 (preﬁx delegation);
or 3) s1 is assigned (allocated or delegated) a set F1 of preﬁxes; s1 has received a set
of routes with a set F2 of preﬁxes; and f1 is aggregated from F1,F2 or both such that
∀fx⊆f1,fx⊆F1∪F2 (preﬁx aggregation).2
3. PRETTY SECURE BGP (PSBGP)
psBGP makes use of a centralizedtrust modelfor authorizing(and verifyingthe authorized
use of) AS numbers, and authenticatingAS public keys. Five RIRs are the root trusted cer-
tiﬁcationauthorities(CAs), andcancross-signeachother’spublickeycertiﬁcates. Another
option would be to have a single CA rooted at IANA. However, for political and availabil-
ity reasons[Seo et al. 2001],we recommendmultiplerootedCA’s (withcross-certiﬁcation)
over a single one. In psBGP, each AS s is issued an intermediate CA public key certiﬁ-
cate (ASNumCert), signed by one of the RIRs (say T), denoted by (ks,s)kT. Such an AS
creates and signs two end-entity certiﬁcates, SpeakerCert and a SessionCert binding two
different public keys to s respectively, and a preﬁx assertion list (PAL). The latter, pals, is
an ordered list: the ﬁrst assertion is for s itself and the rest are endorsements by s for each
of s’s neighbors ordered by AS number. Figure 1 illustrates the certiﬁcate structure used
in psBGP. In what follows, we start with a description of a rating mechanism used by an
AS in determining its conﬁdence in an AS PATH or a preﬁx assertion. We next describe
psBGP with respect to the above ﬁve security goals: G1-G4 here, and G5 in §4.
3.1 A Rating Mechanism
In psBGP, each AS si rates every other AS sj with a value in [0,1], denoted by ri(sj),
representing si’s conﬁdence or belief in sj’s trustworthiness, i.e., in an assertion made by
sj such as a digitally signed AS PATH or a preﬁx assertion or endorsement. ri(sj)=0 or
1 respectively indicates si fully distrusts or trusts sj. When there is no ambiguity, we omit
the subscript on r in ri(sj).
While each AS has freedom in determining how to rate other ASes, we suggest the
following guidelines: an RIR should be fully trusted (i.e., rated 1); a direct neighbor might
be expected, in many cases, to be more trustworthy than a remote AS; and a majority of
ASes should be neutrally trusted, e.g., rated 0.5. We next present a method [Wan et al.
2004] for computing the conﬁdence value in a statement which is consistent among a set
of assertions made by a group of ASes (a corroborating group) based on one’s ratings of
2If f1 is not assigned to s1 and ∃fx⊆f1 such that fx*F1∪F2, then s1 overclaims IP preﬁxes, which is a type
of falsiﬁcation.
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Root AS Number Authorities￿
T ￿ is an￿ RIR￿
ID=AS# =￿ s￿
public key=￿ k￿ s￿
signed using ￿ k￿ T￿
ASNumCert￿
(F￿ s￿,    s)￿
(F￿ 1￿,  s￿ 1￿)￿
...￿
signed using ￿k￿ s￿
PAL￿
ID=AS#=￿ s￿
public key=￿ k￿ '￿
s￿
SpeakerCert￿
signed using ￿k￿ s￿
ID=DN￿
s￿ 1￿,s￿ 2￿,..￿
signed using ￿ k￿ T￿
MultiASCert￿
one MultiASCert per￿
multi-AS organization￿
one ASnumCert per AS￿
ID=AS#=￿ s￿
public key=￿ k￿ "￿
s￿
SessionCert￿
signed using ￿k￿ s￿
Fig. 1. psBGP Certiﬁcate Structure
those ASes. We consider two types of consistency in psBGP: path-consistency and preﬁx-
consistency. The former is regardingthe consistency among a set of digital signatures over
an AS PATH (see Deﬁnitions 1 2 in §3.5). The latter is regarding the consistency of a
preﬁx assertion and a preﬁx endorsement (see Deﬁnition 4 in §4.1).
Let s1,..,sn be a group of ASes which independently produce a set of consistent as-
sertions as1,..,asn. Let λsi,..,sn, abbreviated by λ[1..n], denote a common subset that can
be derived from each of the above n consistent assertions. The precise meaning of λ[1..n]
depends on the type of consistency in question. In preﬁx-consistency, if as1 is a preﬁx as-
sertion (f1,s1)s1, and as2,..,asn preﬁx endorsements (f1,s1)s2,..,(f1,s1)sn, then λ[1..n]
represents a preﬁx assignment of s1, i.e., s1 is assigned a preﬁx f1. In path-consistency, if
as1={f1,[s1,s2]}s1,..,asn={f1,[s1,..,sn,sn+1]}sn are digital signatures present with a
BGP route m=(f1,pn=[s1,..,sn]), then λs1,s2 represents a statement that pn contains a
pathsegment[s1,s2], λs2,s3 representsa statementthat pn containsa pathsegment[s2,s3],
and so on. We next show how an AS si computes a conﬁdence value or a belief in λ[1..n],
denoted b(λ[1..n]), based on si’s ratings of s1,..,sn in the corroborating group. By deﬁni-
tion, si’s rating of sj,1≤j≤n, represents si’s conﬁdence in the assertion aj made by sj or
any subset λsi derived from aj, i.e., b(λsj)=b(asj) , r(sj). b(λ[1..n]) is deﬁned as:
b(λ[1..n]) =



r(s1) if n=1
r(s2) +
￿
1 − r(s2)
￿
· r(s1) if n=2
r(sn) +
￿
1 − r(sn)
￿
· b(λ[1..(n−1)]) if n≥3
(1)
Consistent with Dempster-Shafer theory [Dempster 1967; Shafer 1976] of belief rea-
soning, properties of equation (1) include: i) endorsement from a fully distrusted AS (i.e.,
rated 0) does not increase one’s conﬁdence; ii) endorsement from a fully trusted AS (i.e.,
rated 1) increases one’s conﬁdence to maximum (i.e., 1); and iii) if no AS in the corrob-
orating group is fully distrusted or trusted (i.e., the rating is 0<r<1), one’s conﬁdence
increases but never reaches maximum.
For later cross-reference, Algorithm 1 describes how to increase one’s conﬁdence in
λ[1..(n−1)] when an additional endorsement is obtained, e.g., from sn. Algorithm 2 de-
scribes how to reduce one’s conﬁdence in λ[1..n] when (without loss of generality) sn’s
endorsement is withdrawn.
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Algorithm 1 Adding new endorsement from AS sn
1: INPUT: b(λ[1..(n−1)]),r(sn)
2: OUTPUT: b(λ[1..n])
3: t ← r(sn) + [1 − r(sn)] · b(λ[1..(n−1)])
4: return(t)
Algorithm 2 Removing existing endorsement from AS sn
1: INPUT: b(λ[1..n]),r(sn)
2: OUTPUT: b(λ[1..(n−1)])
3: t ←
b(λ[1..n])−r(sn)
1−r(sn)
4: return(t)
3.2 AS Number Authorization in psBGP (G1)
Following S-BGP [Seo et al. 2001], psBGP makes use of a centralized PKI for AS num-
ber authorization, with ﬁve root Certiﬁcate Authorities (CAs), corresponding to the ﬁve
existing RIRs. When an organization B applies for an AS number, besides supplying doc-
uments currently required, B additionally supplies a public key, and should be required
to prove possession of the corresponding private key [Seo et al. 2001; Adams and Lloyd
2003]. When an AS number is granted to B by an RIR or by its subordinate registries, an
intermediate CA public key certiﬁcate (ASNumCert) is also issued, signed by the issuing
RIR, binding the public key supplied by B to the granted AS number. An AS number s is
called certiﬁed if there is a valid ASNumCert (ks,s)kT, bindings to a publickey ks signed
by one of the RIRs, T.
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug
Start of month 16 554 16 708 16 879 17 156 17 350 17 538 17 699 17 884
Removed during month 153 137 155 174 138 179 164 N/A
Added during month 307 308 432 368 326 342 349 N/A
Table II. AS Number Dynamics from January 1 to August 1, 2004
The proposed PKI for authorizing AS numbers is practical for the following reasons.
a) The roots of the proposed PKI are the existing trusted authorities of the AS number
space, removing a major trust issue which is one of the most difﬁcult parts of a PKI: the
root of a PKI must have control over the name space involved in that PKI. Thus, RIRs are
the natural and logical AS number certiﬁcate authorities. We acknowledge that non-trivial
(but feasible) effort might be required for implementing such a PKI. b) The number of
ASes on the Internet and its growth rate are relatively manageable (see Table II), based
on the RouteViews dataset [RouteViews 2005]. Considering there are ﬁve RIRs, the over-
head of managingASNumCerts should certainlybe manageable,giventhat largerPKIs are
currently commercially operational [Guida et al. 2004].
To verify the authenticity of an ASNumCert, an AS must have the trusted public key (or
veriﬁable certiﬁcate) of the signing RIR. These few root trusted public key certiﬁcates can
be distributed using out-of-band mechanisms to all ASes. ASNumCerts can be distributed
with BGP update messages. An ASNumCert should be revoked when the corresponding
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AS numberis no longer used or is reassigned to anotherorganization. ASNumCerts can be
revoked through any standard means, e.g., a Certiﬁcate Revocation List (CRL) [Housley
et al. 1999](cf. [Ma et al. 2006]),which can be distributed using out-of-bandmechanisms,
e.g., a repository. To summarize, we assume that every AS has the public key certiﬁcates
of RIRs and can obtain the ASNumCerts of any other ASes if and when necessary.
In discussion related to various proposals for securing BGP, there is much debate in the
BGP communityonthearchitectureforauthenticatingthepublickeysofASes, particularly
on the pros and cons of using a strict hierarchical trust model vs. a distributed trust model,
e.g., a web-of-trust model [Zimmermann 1995]. We make use of a strict hierarchical trust
model (with depth of one) for authorizating AS numbers and authenticating their public
keys to providea strong guaranteeof security. Therefore,it would appear to be difﬁcult for
an attacker to spoof an AS in psBGP as long as it cannot obtain the private key correspond-
ing to the public key of an ASNumCert signed by an RIR, or the signing key of an RIR. In
contrast, a web-of-trust model does not provide such a guarantee. Other issues that arise
with a web-of-trust model include: trust bootstrapping, trust transitivity, and vulnerability
to a single misbehaving party [Maurer 1996; Reiter and Stubblebine 1997].
3.3 BGP Speaker Authorization in psBGP (G2)
An AS may have one or more BGP speakers. A BGP speaker must be authorized by an
AS to represent that AS to establish a BGP session with a BGP speaker in another AS.
In psBGP, an AS with a certiﬁed ASNumCert issues an operational end-entity public key
certiﬁcate shared by all BGP speakers within the AS, namely SpeakerCert. A SpeakerCert
is signed using the private key of the issuing AS, corresponding to the public key in the
AS’s ASNumCert (see Figure 1). A SpeakerCert is an assertion made by an AS that a BGP
speakerwith thecorrespondingprivatekeyis authorizedtorepresentthatAS. SpeakerCerts
can be distributed with BGP update messages.
We consider three design choices for BGP speaker authentication: a) each BGP speaker
has a distinct key pair and is issued a unique public key certiﬁcate; b) group signatures
(e.g., see [Boneh et al. 2004]) are used, i.e., each BGP speaker has a unique private key
but shares a common public key and public key certiﬁcate with other speakers in the same
AS; or c) all BGP speakers in a given AS share a common public-private key pair. We
propose the latter primarily for its operational simplicity. Choice a) provides stronger
security in theory but requires more certiﬁcates, and discloses BGP speaker identities,
which may introduce competitive security concerns [White et al. 2004]. Choice b) again
provides stronger security in theory, requires the same number of certiﬁcates, and does not
disclose BGP speaker identities, but involves a more complex system, which we believe
signiﬁcantly reduces its chances of being commercially accepted and securely deployed.
The private keys corresponding to the public keys of a SpeakerCert and SessionCert are
respectively used for signing BGP update messages and establishing secure connections
with neighbors (see §3.4). Therefore, they would most likely be stored in the communica-
tion device associated with a BGP speaker. In contrast, since the private key corresponding
to the public key of an ASNumCert is only used for signing a SpeakerCert, a SessionCert,
and a PAL, it need not be stored in a BGP speaker. Thus, compromising a BGP speaker
at most discloses the private keys of a SpeakerCert and a SessionCert, requiringrevocation
and reissuing of them, without impact on an ASNumCert. This separation of ASNumCerts
from SpeakerCerts and SessionCerts provides a more conservative design (from a secu-
rity viewpoint), and distributes from RIRs to ASes (or their delegated certiﬁcate service
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providers)the workloadof certiﬁcate revocation and reissuing resulting from BGP speaker
compromises. While ASNumberCerts and SpeakerCerts need to be distributed to every
other ASes, e.g., via BGP update messages, a SessionCert need only be distributed to di-
rect neighbors, e.g., via IKEv2 [Kaufman 2005]. In summary, an ASNumCert must be
revoked if the corresponding AS number is re-assigned or the corresponding key is com-
promised; a SpeakerCert or SessionCert must be revoked if a BGP speaker in that AS is
compromised, or for other reasons (e.g., if the private key is lost).
3.4 Data Integrity in psBGP (G3)
To protect data integrity, BGP sessions between neighboringASes must be protected. Fol-
lowing S-BGP and soBGP, psBGP uses IPsec EncapsulatingSecurity Payload(ESP) [Kent
2005] with null encryption for protecting BGP sessions. Since many existing BGP speak-
ers implement TCP MD5 [Heffernan 1998] with manual key conﬁgurations for protecting
BGP sessions, it must be supported by psBGP as well. In psBGP, automatic key manage-
menttechniques,e.g.,IKEv2[Kaufman2005],canbeimplementedto improvethesecurity
of TCP MD5 as each BGP speaker has a unique public-private key pair for BGP session
security.
3.5 AS PATH Veriﬁcation in psBGP (G4)
Regarding “AS PATH security”, different security solutions of BGP deﬁne it differently.
In S-BGP, the security of an AS PATH is interpreted as follows: for every pair of ASes on
the path, the ﬁrst AS authorizes the second to further advertise the preﬁx associated with
this path. In soBGP [White 2003],it is deﬁnedas the plausibilityof an AS PATH, i.e., if an
AS PATH factually exists on the AS graph (whether or not that path was actually traversed
by an update message in question is irrelevant).
Since AS PATH is used by the BGP route selection process, greater assurance of the
integrity of an AS PATH increases the probability that routes are selected based on proper
information. Without strong guarantees of AS PATH integrity, an attacker may be able to
modifyan AS PATH in a such way that it is still plausible in the AS graph and is also more
favored (e.g., with a shorter length) by recipient ASes than the original path. In this way,
a recipient AS may be misled to favor a falsiﬁed route over correct routes, possibly inﬂu-
encing trafﬁc ﬂow. Thus, in our view, it is not sufﬁcient to verify only the existence/non-
existence of an AS PATH if greater assurance of the integrity of an AS PATH can be pro-
vided at acceptable cost.
We choose the S-BGP approach combined with the rating mechanism described in §3.1
to determine dynamically (at run-time) the number of digital signatures on an AS PATH to
be veriﬁed. We ﬁrst give the deﬁnition of path-consistency, then present how to calculate
a conﬁdence value in an AS PATH.
DEFINITION 1 (PATH-CONSISTENCY). Let m=(f1,pk=[s1,..,sk]) be a BGP route,
and sigi={f1,pi}si be a digital signature generated by a psBGP-enabledBGP speaker in
si,1≤i≤k, where {pi}si=[s0
1,..,s0
i+1] is the pathsignedby si. {pi}si is consistent with pk
if {pi}si consists of the ﬁrst i+1 ASes on pk (i.e., s0
1=s1,..,s0
i+1=si+1) when 1≤i≤k−1,
or consists of pk appended by another AS sk+1 when i=k.
DEFINITION 2 (SIGNED-PATH CONSISTENCY). Letm=(f1,pk=[s1,..,sk])beaBGP
route,andsigi={f1,pi}si,sigj={f1,pj}sj thedigitalsignaturesgeneratedbytwopsBGP-
enabled ASes si and sj, 1≤i,j≤k, on pk. {pi}si and {pj}sj are consistent if they both are
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consistent with pk.
Two consistent signed paths {pi}si and {pj}j contain common subset λsi,sj. For ex-
ample, if {p2}s2=[s1,s2,s3],{p4}s4=[s1,s2,s3,s4,s5], λs2,s4 could be an assertion that
pk contains the path segment [s2,s3] since both s2 and s4 assert it in their signed path. As
a result, one may expect the belief in λs2,s4 will increase, which may further contribute to
the belief in pk in some way. However, the deﬁnition of path conﬁdence in psBGP is more
restrictive. In psBGP, the belief in pk, b(pk), is deﬁned as the sum of the belief of each
assertion that pk contains a two-AS path segment [i,i+1],1≤i≤k−1, divided by the total
number of those path segments k−1.
DEFINITION 3 (PATH CONFIDENCE). Letm=(f1,pk=[s1,..,sk])beaBGProute,and
λsi,si+1 be the assertion that pk contains a two-AS path segment [si,si+1]. The belief in
pk is deﬁned as: b(pk) = 1
k−1
Pi=k−1
i=1 b(λsi,si+1).
The belief in the assertion λsi,si+1 that pk contains a two-AS path segment [si,si+1] is
obtained exclusively from the signed paths by si and si+1 (i.e., {pi}si,{pi+1}si+1 since
two ASes have authority over the path segment between themselves. The signed path by
another AS, e.g., si+2, may also contain [si,si+1], but it does not contribute to the belief
in λsi,si+1 since si+2 apparently does not have authority over [si,si+1] and its signed path
may be dependent on the path signed by si or si+1.
If one AS on [si,si+1] is non-psBGP enabled and does not digitally sign its path, the
belief in λsi,si+1 is then solely derived from the signed path of the other AS. If neither
of them has signed the path, i.e., {pi}si and {pi+1}si+1 are null, there is no evidence to
believe λsi,si+1. In this case, b(λsi,si+1) is set to 0.
In psBGP, a minimum of two digital signatures must be veriﬁed if two or more are
present on an AS PATH pk. The exact number of digital signatures to be veriﬁed depends
onaverifyingAS sk+1’s ratingsoftheASeswhichhavesignedpk,andalocalconﬁgurable
conﬁdencethreshold θk+1≥0. Veriﬁcation of pk starts from the digital signature generated
by the last AS sk on pk, and moves toward the ﬁrst AS s1. Upon a digital signature sigi
verifying successfully, i.e., sigi is valid and {pi}si is consistent with pk, the belief in the
assertion λsi,si+1 (1≤i≤k−1) that pk contains [si,si+1] is recomputed (using Algorithm
1) and the current belief in pk is updated (see Deﬁnition 3). If b(pk) is no less then sk+1’s
conﬁdence threshold θk+1, i.e., b(pk)≥θk+1, then pk is accepted. Otherwise, more digital
signatures are veriﬁed (see Algorithm 3) until:
a) one digital signature veriﬁcation fails, in which case pk is rejected; or
b) b(pk)≥θk+1, in which case pk is accepted; or
c) all digital signatures present on pk have been veriﬁed successfully, in which case pk is
accepted regardless of b(pk).
Examining Algorithm 3 (line 5), note that if θk+1 is set to a value higher than 1, then
since 0≤b(pk)≤1, b(pk) will always be less than θk+1. i≥1 remains true until all digital
signatures are veriﬁed. Thus, to always verify all digital signatures present on any received
AS PATH for maximal assurance of path integrity, sk+1 can set θk+1>1 (e.g., θk+1=1.1).
If θk+1=0, b(pk)<θk+1 is always false. Once two digital signatures have been veriﬁed
successfully, n<2 remains false. Thus, no additional digital signature will be veriﬁed.
Such a conﬁguration meets the minimal requirement by psBGP and achieves maximal
Version: January 16, 2007.On Inter-domain Routing Security and Pretty Secure BGP (psBGP) · 13
Algorithm 3 AS PATH Veriﬁcation (by sk+1)
1: GLOBAL: threshold θk+1; sk+1’s trust ratings r(s1),..,r(sk)
2: INPUT: k,pk = [s1,..,sk];sig1,..,sigk
3: OUTPUT: ACCEPT or REJECT the AS PATH pk
4: i ← k;n ← 0;b ← 0 /* b represents b(pk) */
5: while i ≥ 1 and (b < θk+1 or n < 2) do
6: if sigi = φ then
7: x ← 0 /* si has no contribution to belief in λsi−1,si or λsi,si+1 */
8: else if sigi fails veriﬁcation then
9: return(REJECT)
10: else
11: n ← n+1;x ← r(si)
12: endif
13: if i = k then
14: b2 ← 0;b1 ← x /* initial belief in λsk−1,sk */
15: else if 2 ≤ i ≤ k−1 then
16: b2 ← Algorithm1(x,b1) /* ﬁnal belief in λsi,si+1 */
17: b1 ← x /* initial belief in λsi−1,si */
18: else if i = 1 then
19: b2 ← Algorithm1(x,b1) /* ﬁnal belief in λs1,s2 */
20: endif
21: b(pk) ← b(pk) + b2
k−1 /* update belief in pk */
22: i ← i−1
23: return(ACCEPT)
efﬁciency. For 0<θk+1≤1, the number of digital signatures on an AS PATH to be veriﬁed
depends on sk+1’s rating of each signing AS on the path.
Such conﬁguration ﬂexibility is in line with the recommendation that “a good initial
solution is one that can easily be upgraded to handle increased threats” [Bellovin et al.
2005]. For example, an AS with constrained hardware resources (e.g., CPU) can choose
to verify fewer digital signatures on an AS PATH by setting a lower threshold, while other
ASes may choose to verify more or all digital signatures on a signed AS PATH to achieve
a higher assurance of AS PATH integrity.
We refer to psBGP AS PATH veriﬁcationas stepwise integrity, which allows conﬁdence
ratings on AS PATH integrity to be formed based on local parameters, and without requir-
ing all ASes on the AS PATH to digitally sign the path, or verify all digital signatures
present. In contrast, the S-BGP AS PATH veriﬁcation approach provides full integrity,
but requires full adoption of S-BGP by all ASes on the path and veriﬁcation of all digi-
tal signatures present. We acknowledge that the beneﬁt from verifying a partially secured
AS PATH depends on whether or not a non-psBGP enabled BGP speaker on the path has
sufﬁcient memory to store and forward digital signatures (cf. §4.1.2).
Thisstepwiseintegrityis comparabletotheapproachtakenbyIRV [Goodelletal.2003].
In IRV, one can choose to verify a subset of or the complete AS PATH based on the query
results returnedfromotherIRVs andlocalparameters,e.g.,based onpsBGP’s ratingmech-
anisms. The difference is that IRV adopts an out-of-band approach which does not require
any changeto existing BGP implementationbut incurs extra queryand responsemessages,
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D￿
10.1/16￿
A￿ B￿
C￿ E￿
10.2/16￿
10.3/16￿ 10.2.1/24￿
192.3/16￿
{(￿ 10.1/16, A￿ ), (10.2/16,B), (0,C), (192.3/16,D)} ￿ A￿
{(￿ 10.2/16, B￿), (0,A), (10.3/16,C), (10.2.1/24,E)} ￿ B￿
{(￿ 10.3/16, C￿ ), (10.1/16,A), (0,B), (10.2.1/24,E)} ￿ C￿
{(￿ 192.3/16, D￿ ), (0,A)}￿ D￿
{(￿ 10.2.1/24, E￿ ), (0,B), (0,C)}￿ E￿
Fig. 2. A small AS graph with IP preﬁxes and PALs (0 denotes φ)
while in psBGP, change to BGP is required but information needed for AS PATH veriﬁca-
tion is either carried within a BGP update message or stored locally.
4. PREFIX ORIGIN AUTHENTICATION IN PSBGP (G5)
We start with descriptions of PALs and MultiASCerts, and then introduce how to build
from them an AS preﬁx graph. We then describe how psBGP uses an AS preﬁx graph to
verify the propriety of preﬁx origin per G5 in §2.3.
4.1 Preﬁx Assertion Lists (PALs)
Facing the difﬁculty of building a centralized infrastructure for tracing changes in IP ad-
dress assignments (recall §1), psBGP uses a decentralized approach for verifying the pro-
priety of a preﬁx assertion by cross-checking its consistency with endorsements from the
neighbors of the asserting AS.
In psBGP, each AS si creates and signs an ordered preﬁx assertion list (pali), consisting
ofanumberoftuplesoftheform(preﬁxes,AS#),i.e.,pali={(Fi,si),(F1,s1),..,(Fn,sn)}si,
where for the components (Fj,sj),1≤j6=i≤n, sj∈N(si) and sj<sj+1. The ﬁrst tuple
(Fi,si) is an assertion by si of preﬁxes Fi which include preﬁxes owned by si itself and
preﬁxes authorized by their respective owners for si to originate (referred to as preﬁx as-
sertions); the rest are ordered by AS number, and are assertions by si of preﬁxes assigned
to each of si’s neighbors (referred to as preﬁx endorsements). If si chooses not to endorse
any preﬁx for a neighbor sj or has no information of sj’s preﬁx assignments, si simply
declares null in its preﬁx endorsement for sj. Thus, (Fj,sj)si (Fj=φ) simply asserts that
sj is a direct neighbor of si (see Figure 2). If si is not willing to disclose that sj is a direct
neighbor, si can leave out from pali the preﬁx endorsement for sj.
DEFINITION 4 PREFIX-CONSISTENCY. Let (fi,si)si be a preﬁx assertion by si and
(f0
i,s0
i)sj a preﬁx endorsement by sj. (f0
i,s0
i)sj is consistent with (fi,si)si, denoted by
(f0
i,s0
i)sj
. =(fi,si)si, if theyare regardingthe preﬁx assignment of the same AS, i.e., s0
i=si,
and f0
i is equal to or a superset of fi, i.e., f0
i⊇fi.
Inferred from Deﬁnition 4, (f0
i,s0
i)sj is not consistent with (fi,si)si, if 1) they are re-
garding the preﬁx assignment of different ASes; 2) they have null mutual intersection, i.e.,
f0
i∩fi=φ; or 3) f0
i is a proper subset of fi, i.e., f0
i⊂fi. In case 3, while f0
i and fi do share
a common subset which is f0
i, they are not considered consistent in psBGP for the sake
of simplicity of AS preﬁx graph maintenance. In psBGP, preﬁx consistency is checked
between a preﬁx assertion and an endorsement, but not between two preﬁx endorsements.
While an AS is free to decide for which neighbors it provides preﬁx endorsements and
from which to solicit preﬁx endorsements for itself, we recommend that a provider AS en-
dorsepreﬁxesforacustomerAS,possiblybecomingapartofanexistingserviceagreement
which includes not only physical network connectivity but now also preﬁx endorsements.
Two neighboring ASes with a peer relationship have freedom to decide how one will en-
dorse preﬁx assertions made by the other. Preﬁx endorsements between two peering ASes
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might be asymmetric; in the extreme case, AS si may endorse all preﬁxes assigned to a
peering AS sj, while sj endorses no preﬁx assigned to si. It is important to allow such
ﬂexibility. In the core of the Internet, one AS may peer with many others, some of which
may be assigned a large number of preﬁxes. It would be unrealistic to expect an AS to
have full knowledge of all preﬁxes assigned to such a peer. However, an AS might be able
to establish a certain level of conﬁdence in a subset of the preﬁxes assigned to some of its
neighbors. Thus, an AS can distribute such positive (albeit partial) evidence to facilitate
other ASes to make a better decision in preﬁx origin authentication. It is an AS’s own
responsibility and in its own interest to ensure that its assigned preﬁxes are endorsed by
some of its neighbors or by an RIR.
4.1.1 Due Diligence. As a new requirement in psBGP, each AS is responsible for car-
rying out some level of due diligence off-line: for the safety of that AS and of the whole
Internet, to increase its conﬁdence that the preﬁxes it endorses for a direct neighbor are
indeed assigned to that AS. We suggest the effort required for this is both justiﬁable and
practical, since two neighboring ASes usually have a business relationship (e.g., a trafﬁc
agreement) with each other, allowing some level of off-line direct interactions and the es-
tablishment of some level of trust. For example, si may ask a neighboring AS sj to show
the proof that sj in fact holds preﬁx fj or is authorized by the holder of fj to announce
fj. An AS may also ask a senior ofﬁcial of the neighboring AS organization to provide
a formal letter asserting the organization’s preﬁx claim. Publicly available information
about IP address allocation and delegation may also be helpful. We note that while preﬁx
endorsements may be linked to the reputation of an issuing AS, they are not intended to
create any legal liability on the issuing AS (if this is viewed as a practical concern, it might
be made an explicit term of agreement to participation in psBGP).
4.1.2 Propagating PALs in Update Messages. A PAL can be distributed along with
BGP update messages in a newly deﬁned optional and transitive path attribute. A non-
psBGP enabled BGP speaker which does not understand these newly deﬁned attributes
need not process them but must propagate them. Thus, PALs travel through non-psBGP
enabled BGP speakers to reach psBGP-enabled ones. Each psBGP-enabled BGP speaker
can then construct and update its AS preﬁx graph from received PALs (see §4.3). This
mechanism assumes that a non-psBGP enabled BGP speaker has sufﬁcient memory to
store and forward PALs (see §6.3.1). If some non-psBGP enabled BGP speakers cannot
meet memory requirements, non-contiguous deployment of psBGP may cause problems.
Thus, the aboveassumption may rightly be viewed as questionablefor present-dayrouters,
many of which might have limited memory, e.g., 256M bytes. However, as widely agreed,
the deployment of a BGP security proposal like psBGP would be gradual. Thus, memory
burden incurredon a non-psBGP enabled router might be moderate until a large number of
ASes ontheInternethavedeployedpsBGP. Onemightoptimisticallyhopethat if andwhen
a proposal like psBGP might eventually be widely adopted, e.g., in ﬁve or more years,
memory availability at routers would accommodate this (cf. [Kent 2003]). PALs could
alternatively be distributed through out-of-band mechanisms, e.g., security respositories
(cf. [Kent et al. 2000]).
4.2 Multiple-AS Certiﬁcate (MultiASCerts)
Ideally, two PALs issued by two neighboringASes are based on independentdata sources,
and consequently, with high probability (in the absence of collusion), a preﬁx erroneously
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asserted by one AS will not be endorsed by any of its neighbors. However, there are
some organizations owning multiple ASes, and it is a common practice for a multi-AS
organizationto use a single centralizeddatabase for generatingrouterconﬁgurationsfor all
of its owned ASes. Thus, it is possible that PALs issued by two neighboring ASes owned
by a common organization would also be created from a single centralized database. If a
preﬁx is erroneously entered into such a database, it might end up with a pair of erroneous
yet consistent preﬁx assertion and endorsement, introducing a single point of failure. We
recommend that “best practice” in psBGP requires that an AS obtain preﬁx endorsement
from another AS owned by a different organization. As a recommended BGP local policy,
an AS should ignore a preﬁx endorsement by sj for si if both si and sj are known to be
owned by a common organization.
To facilitate the distribution of the knowledge of AS ownership by a multi-AS organiza-
tion, psBGP makes use of a new certiﬁcate, namely MultiASCert (recall Figure 1), which
binds a list of ASes owned by a common organization to the name of that organization,
and is signed by an RIR. Preﬁx endorsements by sj for si should be ignored if si and sj
appear on a MultiASCert. In this way, human errors by a multi-AS organizationregarding
a preﬁx that is assigned to another psBGP-enabled AS and endorsed by an independent
neighboring AS will not result in service disruption of that preﬁx in psBGP (see §4.4.1).
4.3 AS Preﬁx Graph
We introduce as a new concept the AS preﬁx graph, which contains information about
AS connectivity, AS preﬁx assignments (or preﬁx-AS bindings), and ratings of AS pre-
ﬁx assignments. An AS preﬁx graph, constructed by each AS sc, is an attributed graph
Gc=(V,E,H), where V ={si} is a set of AS numbers, E={eij} is a set of edges (BGP
sessions) with eij connecting si to sj, and H: V →W is a function mapping each AS si
to a set of three-dimensional variables, which speciﬁes the IP preﬁxes asserted by si, and
supporting evidence; we call H(si) the APAS set (associated preﬁxes and support) for si.
More precisely, H(si)={(fx,bx,Cx)}, where fx⊆P is an IP preﬁx, bx∈[0,1] represents
sc’s conﬁdence that fx is assigned to si, and Cx is a list of ASes asserting and endorsing
the preﬁx assignment (fx,si). We next present how each psBGP-enabled AS constructs
and updates its own AS preﬁx graph based on the PALs and MultiASCerts it has received.
4.3.1 AS Preﬁx Graph Construction. An AS preﬁx graph is initialized to null before
the BGP speaker receives any PAL (e.g., when it ﬁrst connects to the Internet). All BGP
speakers within an AS build their own AS preﬁx graph independently. An AS sc builds its
AS preﬁx graph Gc=(V,E,H) from the ﬁrst pali received from each si on the Internet
by performing the following tasks: a) adding si and all of its declared neighbors to V ;
b) adding to E an edge from si to each of its declared neighbors; c) updating H(si) for
each of the preﬁxes asserted by si; d) updating H(sj) for each of the preﬁxes asserted by
sj∈N(si) and endorsed by si. See Algorithm 4 for the details and §4.3.3 for an example.
4.3.2 AS Preﬁx Graph Update. Here we describe how to update an AS preﬁx graph
from a newly received pal0
i which replaces an existing pali that has been previously used
to construct or update an AS preﬁx graph. The preﬁx-AS bindings in pali and pal0
i can
be divided into three categories: removed, unchanged, and added. A removed preﬁx-AS
binding appears in pali but not in pal0
i; an unchanged one appears in both; and a newly
added one appears in pal0
i but not in pali. Updating an AS preﬁx graph is performed in
two phases (see Algorithm 5 for details) as follows:
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Algorithm 4 AS Preﬁx Graph Construction (for AS sc)
1: GLOBAL: Gc=(V,E,H); existing PALs; {rc(si)|si is an AS on the Internet}
2: INPUT: pali
3: OUTPUT: updated AS preﬁx graph Gc
4: /* Fi,N(si) are preﬁxes and neighbors asserted by si for itself in pali respectively */
5: V ← V ∪si;H(si) ← φ
6: for each fx ∈ Fi do
7: (fx,bx,Cx) ← (fx,r(si),{si})
8: for each sj ∈ N(si) do
9: V ← V ∪sj; E ← E∪eij
10: for each preﬁx endorsement (f,s)sj in palj do
11: /* recall Deﬁnition 4 */
12: if (f,s)sj
. = (fx,si)si and si,sj are not in a common MultiASCert then
13: bx ← Algorithm1
￿
bx,r(sj)
￿
; Cx ← Cx∪sj
14: H(si) ← H(si)∪(fx,bx,Cx);
15: for each sj ∈ N(si) do
16: retrieve APAS set H(sj) = {(fy,by,Cy)}
17: for each (fy,by,Cy) ∈ H(sj) do
18: for each preﬁx endorsement (f,s)si in pali do
19: if (f,s)si
. = (fy,sj)sj and si,sj are not in a common MultiASCert then
20: by ← Algorithm1
￿
by,r(si)
￿
; Cy ← Cy∪si
21: H(sj) ← H(sj)∪(fy,by,Cy)
22: return
(1) Removingpreﬁx-ASbindings. Ifaremovedpreﬁx-ASbindingisanassertion,(fx,si)si,
made by si for itself, it is simply removed from the graph. If it is an endorsement,
(fy,sj)si, by si for sj∈N(si), the conﬁdence in sj’s assertion of fy must be updated
(using Algorithm 2).
(2) Adding preﬁx-AS bindings. If an added preﬁx-AS binding is an assertion, (fx,si)si,
made by si for itself, a conﬁdence value must be computed for (fx,si)si (using Algo-
rithm 1). If it is a preﬁx endorsement, (fy,sj)si, and (fy,sj)sj exists in the graph, the
conﬁdence in (fy,sj)sj must be updated (using Algorithm 1).
4.3.3 Example 1. Figure 3 illustrates Algorithm 4 for an AS D. Assume D fully trusts
itsserviceproviderA(i.e.,r(A)=1),andpartiallytruststheotherASes(r(B)=r(E)=0.5,r(C)=0.8).
The AS preﬁx graph is constructed based on the following PALs received by D in order
(here we focus on the construction of the APAS set):
palD={(192.3/16,D),(φ,A)}D,
palA={(10.1/16,A),(10.2/16,B),(φ,C),(192.3/16,D)}A,
palB={(10.2/16,B),(φ,A),(10.3/16,C),(10.2.1/24,E)}B,
palC={(10.3/16,C),(10.1/16,A),(φ,B),(10.2.1/24,E)}C,
palE={(10.2.1/24,E),(φ,B),(φ,C)}E.
1) D starts frompalD issued by itself, and updates the graphas: V ={D,A};E={eDA};
and H(D)={(192.3/16,1.0,{D})}. After receiving palA, D initializes H(A) to
{(10.1/16,1.0,{A})} (Algorithm 4 (line 7)). Since A endorses D’s preﬁx assertion,
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Algorithm 5 AS Preﬁx Graph Update (for AS sc)
1: GLOBAL: Gc=(V,E,H); existing PALs; {rc(si)|si is an AS on the Internet}
2: INPUT: pal0
i
3: OUTPUT: updated AS preﬁx graph Gc
4: /* N(si)0 is the set of neighbors asserted by si for itself in pal0
i */
5: /* Removing preﬁx-AS bindings */
6: for each preﬁx assertion (fx,si)si in pali that is not in pal0
i do
7: retrieve the APAS set H(si) = {(fx,bx,Cx)}
8: H(si)←H(si) − (fx,bx,Cx) /* set subtraction */
9: for each preﬁx endorsement (fy,sj)si in pali that is not in pal0
i do
10: retrieve the APAS set H(sj) = {(fy,by,Cy)}
11: if H(sj) 6= φ and si ∈ Cy then
12: by ← Algorithm2
￿
by,r(si)
￿
; Cy ← Cy − si
13: for each sj in N(si) that is not in N(si)0 do
14: E ← E − eij
15: if sj has no neighbor or preﬁx assignment in Gc then
16: V ← V − sj
17: /* Adding preﬁx-AS bindings */
18: for each sj in N(si)0 that is not in N(si) do
19: V ← V ∪sj; E ← E∪eij
20: for each preﬁx assertion (fx,si)si in pal0
i that is not in pali do
21: (fx,bx,Cx) ← (fx,r(si),{si})
22: for each sj ∈ N(si)0 do
23: for each preﬁx endorsement (f,s)sj in palj do
24: if (f,s)sj
. = (fx,si)si and si,sj are not in a common MultiASCert then
25: bx ← Algorithm1
￿
bx,r(sj)
￿
; Cx ← Cx∪sj
26: H(si) ← H(si)∪(fx,bx,Cx)
27: for each sj ∈ N(si)0 do
28: for each preﬁx endorsement (f,sj)si ∈ pal0
i that is not in pali do
29: retrieve APAS set H(sj) = {(fy,by,Cy)}
30: for each (fy,by,Cy) ∈ H(sj) do
31: if (f,sj)si
. = (fy,sj)sj and si,sj are not in a common MultiASCert then
32: by ← Algorithm1
￿
by,r(si)
￿
; Cy ← Cy∪si
33: return
H(D) is updated to {(192.3/16,1.0,{D,A})}. While A also endorses B’s preﬁx
assertion, no action is taken at this time since D has not received palB.
2) After receiving palB, D initializes H(B)={(10.2/16,0.5,{B})}. Since A endorses
(10.2/16,B),Algorithm1(0.5,1.0)is calledtoupdateD’sconﬁdencein(10.2/16,B),
and H(B) is updated to {(10.2/16,1.0,{B,A})}.
3) After receiving palC, D initializes H(C)={(10.3/16,0.8,{C})}. Since B endorses
(10.3/16,C),Algorithm1(0.8,0.5)is called to updateD’s conﬁdencein (10.3/16,C)
to 0.9, and H(C) is updatedto {(10.3/16,0.9,{C,B})}. Since C endorses A’s preﬁx
assertion, Algorithm1(1.0,0.8) is called to update D’s conﬁdence in (10.1/16,A),
which does not change since it already has maximal value 1.0 (see above). H(A) is
updated to {(10.1/16,1.0,{A,C})}.
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D￿ A￿
192.3/16,￿ 1.0￿ 10.1/16, ￿ 1.0￿ 192.3/16,￿ 1.0￿
D￿ A￿ B￿
C￿
10.1/16, ￿ 1.0￿ 192.3/16,￿ 1.0￿
D￿ A￿ B￿
C￿ E￿
10.2/16, ￿ 1.0￿
10.1/16, ￿ 1.0￿ 192.3/16,￿ 1.0￿
D￿ A￿ B￿
C￿ E￿
10.2/16, ￿ 1.0￿
10.3/16, ￿ 0.9￿
10.1/16, ￿ 1.0￿ 192.3/16,￿ 1.0￿
D￿ A￿ B￿
C￿ E￿
10.2/16, ￿ 1.0￿
10.3/16, ￿ 0.9￿ 10.2.1/24, ￿ 0.95￿
pal￿ A￿ pal￿ B￿
pal￿ C￿ pal￿ E￿
Fig. 3. Construction of an AS Preﬁx Graph by AS D (see Example 1)
4) After receiving palE, D initializes H(E)={(10.2.1/24,0.5,{E})}. Since B en-
dorses (10.2.1/24,E), Algorithm1(0.5,0.5) is called to update D’s conﬁdence in
(10.2.1/24,E) to 0.75. Since C also endorses (10.2.1/24,E), Algorithm1(0.75,0.8)
is calledto furtherupdateD’s conﬁdencein(10.2.1/24,E)to0.95. As a result, H(E)
is updated to {(10.2.1/24,0.95,{E,B,C})}.
4.4 Preﬁx Origin Authentication
Here we describe how to perform preﬁx origin authentication using an AS preﬁx graph.
4.4.1 Veriﬁcation of Preﬁx Assignment. Two conﬁgurable thresholds, denoted by αi
(sufﬁcient conﬁdence) and βi (sufﬁcient claimants), are used by each psBGP-enabled AS
si for verifying the propriety of preﬁx assignments. αi is a threshold deﬁning a sufﬁcient
conﬁdence level by si in a preﬁx-AS binding before it can be considered proper. βi de-
ﬁnes a sufﬁcient number of ASes which assert and endorse a preﬁx-AS binding before the
binding can be considered proper by si. In other words, a preﬁx-AS binding (fj,sj) is
veriﬁed as proper by si if si’s conﬁdence in (fj,sj) is at least αi, or (fj,sj) is asserted by
sj and endorsed by at least βi−1 other ASes. More speciﬁcally, a non-aggregated route
(f,[sj,..]) originated by a psBGP-enabled AS sj is veriﬁed by another psBGP-enabled
AS si as proper if a) there exists (fx,bx,Cx)∈H(sj); b) bx≥αi or |Cx|≥βi; and c) f⊆fx.
Algorithm 6 speciﬁes this explicitly.
Algorithm 6 Veriﬁcation of Preﬁx Assignment (by an AS si)
1: GLOBAL: Gi = (V,E,H);αi;βi
2: INPUT: The BGP route m = (fj,p = [sj,..])
3: OUTPUT: ACCEPT or REJECT sj’s origin of fj
4: retrieve the APAS set H(sj) = {(fx,bx,Cx)} from Gi
5: for each (fx,bx,Cx) ∈ H(sj) do
6: if (bx≥αi or |Cx|≥βi) and fj⊆fx then
7: return(ACCEPT)
8: return(REJECT)
αi and βi are independent and in conjunction provide extensive ﬂexibility. αi=1 allows
si to immediately accept a preﬁx assertion by a fully trusted AS (i.e., without any neighbor
endorsement),while preﬁx assertions madeby partially trustedASes requireendorsements
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from a sufﬁcient number of neighbors. αi and βi can also be conﬁguredsuch that only one
or neither takes effect. For example, αi>1 and βi≥1 allows βi to always take precedence
since the maximum conﬁdence in a preﬁx assertion is 1. 0<αi≤1 and βi=∞ has the
opposite effect. αi=0 and βi=0 emulate the existing non-secured BGP behavior (i.e., any
preﬁx originated by any AS is considered as proper).
During the early stages of psBGP deployment, when only a small number of ASes have
deployed psBGP, we recommend βi=1 for each psBGP-enabled AS si. In other words, a
psBGP-enabled AS si allows another psBGP-enabled AS sj to originate a preﬁx fj if fj
is asserted in palj even it is not endorsed by any neighbor. This reﬂects the reality that
early psBGP adopters might not have any psBGP-enabled neighbors, and it offers some
level of assurance (albeit limited). For example, a compromised BGP speaker within a
psBGP-enabled AS sj cannot be used to hijack preﬁxes assigned to other ASes unless
keying material required for issuing palj is also compromised. In addition, the existence
of a public statement about an assertion provides some assurance, in that this might carry
some weight in legal dispute or affect business reputation. See §6.1.2 for more discussion
on incremental beneﬁts and §5.2.3 on limitations of psBGP.
After a majority of ASes have deployed psBGP, we recommend βi=2, i.e., a psBGP-
enabled AS si allows another psBGP-enabled AS sj to originate a preﬁx fj only if fj is
asserted in palj and is endorsed by one of sj’s neighbors. βi= 2 is resilient to some errors
resulting from a single AS. For example, if sj mistakenly asserts a preﬁx f in palj and
announcesf via BGP, this would not result in service disruption of the legitimate owner of
f as long as sj’s assertion of f is not endorsed by any neighbor. However, βi=2 remains
vulnerable to two-party collusion. More generally, βi = k≥2 resists collusion by k−1
parties. Larger βi renders a stronger assurance in the propriety of a preﬁx assignment, but
trades off performance and results in higher maintenance overhead (see §6.3.4).
4.4.2 Veriﬁcation of Preﬁx Aggregation. Suppose AS s1 is assigned a set of preﬁxes
F1. Whenreceivinga set ofrouteswitha set ofpreﬁxesF2, theBGP speciﬁcation[Rekhter
andLi 1995]allows s1 to aggregateF2 into a single preﬁxfg to reduceroutinginformation
to be stored and transmitted. We call fg an aggregated preﬁx. s1 can aggregate F2 into fg
if one of the following conditions holds: 1) ∀fi⊆fg,fi⊆F1; or 2) ∀fi⊆fg,fi⊆F1∪F2.
In case 1), s1 must be assigned a set of preﬁxesF1, which is a superset of the aggregated
preﬁx fg. Most likely, fg is one of the preﬁxes assigned to s1, i.e., fg∈F1. This type of
aggregation is sometimes referred to as preﬁx re-origination. From a routing perspective,
preﬁx re-originationdoes not have any effect since trafﬁc destined to a more speciﬁc preﬁx
will be forwarded to the re-originating AS and then forwarded to the ultimate destination
from there. From a policy enforcement perspective, preﬁx re-origination does have an
effect since the AS PATH of an aggregated route is different from any of the AS PATHs
of the routes to be aggregated. Since AS PATH is used by the route selection process,
changing AS PATH has an impact on route selections. From a security perspective, preﬁx
re-origination is no different than normal preﬁx origination since the aggregated preﬁx is
either the same as, or a subset of, the preﬁx assigned by the aggregating AS. Therefore, fg
can be veriﬁed using the mechanism in §4.4.1.
In case 2), s1 is not assigned the whole address space of the aggregatedpreﬁx fg. There-
fore, fg cannot be veriﬁed in the same way as for preﬁx re-origination. To facilitate veriﬁ-
cation of the propriety of route aggregation by a receiving AS, psBGP imposes a new re-
quirement: the routes to be aggregated must be supplied by the aggregating AS along with
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the aggregated route. This approach is essentially similar to that taken by S-BGP. Trans-
mission of routes to be aggregatedincurs additionalnetwork overhead,which is something
BGP tries to reduce. However, we view such additional overhead to be relatively insigniﬁ-
cant given that modern communication networks generally have high bandwidth and BGP
control messages account for only a small fraction of subscriber trafﬁc. The main purpose
of route aggregation is to reduce the size of routing tables, i.e., reducing storage require-
ments; note that this is preserved by psBGP.
4.5 Route Selection Algorithm
In standard BGP, when a BGP speaker receives two valid routes with the same destina-
tion preﬁx, a route selection process is invoked to determine which is preferable. In what
follows, a preﬁx-AS binding of a route means the binding of the preﬁx and the AS that
originates that route. psBGP adds two new rules: one gives preference to a route whose
preﬁx-AS binding has more neighbor endorsements, and the other to a route whose preﬁx-
AS binding is rated higher. These two new rules are added into the fourth and ﬁfth places
in BGP route selection algorithm [Rekhter and Li 1995] to preserve existing trafﬁc engi-
neering practices which usually employ local pref, as path and med (mult exit disc).
Note that the higher-numberedrule is followed if the lower-numbered rules result in a tie.
1) Select the route with a higher degree of preference, i.e., a higher local pref value.
2) Select the route with a shorter as path.
3) Select the route with a lower med value if they have the same next hop.
4) Select the route whose preﬁx-AS binding is endorsed by more neighbors.
5) Select the route whose preﬁx-AS binding is rated higher.
6) Select the route with a lower intra-domain routing cost to the next hop.
Ongoing work [Retana and White 2002] suggests to allow customer-deﬁned rules to be
inserted anywhere in the standard BGP route selection algorithm. If this is implemented in
psBGP, customers with high security requirementcan choose to movepsBGP-related rules
up to an appropriate decision point, e.g., as rules 1 and 2.
We donotexpecttheproposedchangestoBGProuteselectionprocesswillhavematerial
impact on route convergence, since they are placed near the bottom of the process. It is
likely that the route selection process will end after the ﬁrst three rules have been applied.
However, if one chooses to move the psBGP-related rules up, there will be some effect on
route convergence. The actual effect dependsona numberof factors, includingthe number
of ASes adopting such changes, and their locations on the Internet, among others. Further
study is needed to obtain quantitative results of the effect.
5. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF PSBGP
We ﬁrst analyze psBGP against the listed security goals from §2. We then discuss how
psBGP counters selected BGP threats.
5.1 Meeting Speciﬁed Security Goals
The analysis below clariﬁes how the proposed psBGP mechanisms meet the speciﬁed
goals, and by what line of reasoning and assumptions. While we believe that mathe-
matical “proofs” of security may often be based on ﬂawed assumptions or models (e.g.,
see [Koblitz and Menezes 2004]) that fail to guarantee “security” in any real-world sense,
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they are nevertheless very useful, e.g., for ﬁnding security ﬂaws, for precisely capturing
protocol goals, and for reducing ambiguity, all of which increase conﬁdence. We thus
provide outlines of such formalized reasoning, as a complement to alternative methods of
increasing conﬁdence.
PROPOSITION 1. psBGP provides AS number authentication (G1).
ProofOutline: ForanASnumberstobecertiﬁed,psBGPrequiresanASNumCert(ks,s)kT.
Since T (i.e., an RIR) controls s, and is the trusted guardian of AS numbers (by assump-
tion), any assertion made by T about s is proper. Thus (ks,s)kT is proper. In other words,
s is an AS number certiﬁed by T, and ks is a public key associated with s certiﬁed by T.
More formally,3 (T controls s) ∧ (ks,s)kT ⇒ (ks,s) is a proper binding.
PROPOSITION 2. psBGP provides BGP speaker authentication (G2).
Proof Outline: For a BGP speaker g to be accepted as an authorized representative of an
AS s, psBGP requiresan ASNumCert(ks,s)kT, a SpeakerCert(k0
s,s)ks, andevidencethat
g possesses k0
s. By Proposition 1, (ks,s)kT establishes that s is an AS number certiﬁed by
T and ks is a public key associated with s certiﬁed by T. Similarly, (k0
s,s)ks establishes
that k0
s is a public key associated with s certiﬁed by s. Evidence that g possesses k0
s (i.e.,
an appropriate digital signature generated by g using k0
s) establishes that g is authorized
by s to represent s. Thus, the Proposition is established. More formally, (T controls s) ∧
(ks,s)kT ⇒ (ks,s) is a proper binding; (ks,s) is proper ∧ (k0
s,s)ks ⇒ (k0
s,s) is proper
binding; (k0
s,s) is proper ∧ g possesses k0
s ⇒ g is authorized by s.
PROPOSITION 3. psBGP provides data integrity (G3).
Proof Outline: psBGP uses the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [Kent and
Atkinson 1998b] with null encryption for protecting BGP sessions, and relies upon IPsec
ESP for data integrity. Thus this provides data integrity in practice, to the extent that one
can rely on practical implementations of IPsec ESP.
PROPOSITION 4. psBGP provides assurance of AS PATH authentication (G4).
Proof Outline: Let mk=(f1,pk) be a BGP route, where pk=[s1,..,sk], and mk is origi-
nated or forwarded by a BGP speaker in sk. For simplicity, we refer to an AS instead of a
BGP speaker within that AS. In psBGP, the integrity of pk implies that mk has traversed
the exact sequence of s1,..,sk. We next use induction on path length to show that psBGP
provides AS PATH integrity when all ASes on an AS PATH are psBGP-enabled and the
verifying AS chooses to verify all digital signatures on the path, followed by discussion of
other cases.
(1) If k=1, psBGP requires that for s2 to accept m1, s2 must receive a valid digital signa-
ture sig1 = {f1,[s1,s2]}s1, which serves as a signed assertion that s1 originated m1
(and advertised it to s2).
(2) Assumewhenk=n≥2, thereexistdigitalsignaturessig1,..,sign whichassertthat mn
indeed traversed the exact sequence of s1,..,sn. When k=n+1, we need to show that
mn+1 hastraversedfromsn tosn+1 andexitedsn+1. sign = {f1,[s1,..,sn,sn+1]}sn
3Here we adapt BAN-like notation, modiﬁed for our purpose (cf. [Burrows et al. 1989; Gaarder and Snekkenes
1991; Gligor et al. 1991]).
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asserts that sn forwards mn to sn+1. psBGP requires that sn+1 digitally signs mn+1
bygeneratingadigitalsignaturesign+1 = {f1,[s1,...,sn+1,sn+2]}sn+1,whichserves
astheevidencethatmn+1 is advertisedbysn+1 toanotherASsn+2. Insummary,sign
asserts that mn traversed from sn to sn+1, and sign+1 asserts that mn is transformed
by sn+1 to mn+1 which traversed through sn+1 to another AS. Thus, the above three
steps establish Proposition 4 when all ASes on an AS PATH are psBGP-enabled and
the verifying AS veriﬁed all digital signatures on the path.
Partial AS PATH integrity. If an AS chooses not to always verify all digital signatures
on the path (i.e., setting θ<1, or some digital signatures are missing; see Algorithm 3 and
§3.5), full integrity of the path is not guaranteed. For example, let pk=[s1,..,sj,..,sk].
If an AS only veriﬁes the digital signatures generated by ASes from sj to sk, only the
integrity of that the path segment is protected. The path from s1 to sj−1 can be falsi-
ﬁed if all ASes from sj to sk are in collusion. As another example, consider the route
m=(f,[s1,s2,s3,s4]) with only s2 psBGP-enabled. The digital signature generated by a
well-behaveds2, {f,[s1,s2,s3]}s2, coversthe path[s1,s2,s3]. Inotherwords,a malicious
AS cannotcompromisetheintegrityof[s1,s2,s3], butitcaninsertanynon-psBGPenabled
AS after s3 or modify s4 to another non-psBGP enabled AS. In addition, [s1,s2,s3] can
be removed or replaced as a whole with other non-psBGP enabled ASes.
We next establish Proposition 5. As discussed in §3.1, psBGP uses a rating mechanism
to provide the ﬂexibility to allow an AS to fully trust an AS or an RIR, thus accepting their
preﬁx assertions without requiring additional endorsements. We recommend that no AS
should be fully trusted unless there is strong reason to do so. In the rest of our analysis, we
assume that a verifying AS si does not immediately trust any other AS sj. In other words,
si rates every other AS sj with a value lower than its conﬁdence threshold, i.e., ri(sj)<αi.
Before presenting Proposition 5, we establish two Lemmas.
LEMMA 1. Assuming that no two ASes are in collusion (A1),4 then psBGP with thresh-
old β=2 provides reasonable5 assurance of preﬁx assignment veriﬁcation, i.e., a preﬁx
assignment that is veriﬁed as proper is, with reasonable assurance, proper.
ProofOutline: ConsidertheBGP routem=(fx,[si,..]). Forfx tobeveriﬁedas assigned
to si, psBGP requires that for some fi:
(R1) preﬁx assertion (fi,si)si exists; (R2) (f0
i,si)sj
. =(fi,si)si exists for sj∈N(si);
(R3) si,sj do not appear in a common MultiASCert; and (R4) fx⊆fi.
R1, R2, and R3 establish that fi is assigned to si, and R4 shows that fx is a subset of
fi. Suppose fi is not assigned to si but is veriﬁed as such (i.e., R1-R4 are met). For this
statement to be true, the following statements must be true: (fi,si)si is improper; and
(fi,si)sj is improper. Since (fi,si)si and (fi,si)sj are improper and consistent, si and sj
either share a common false data source (H1) or they are considered in collusion (H2). R3
reduces the likehood of H1, and H2 is ruled out by assumption A1. Thus, the statement
that fi is not assigned to si but is veriﬁed as such is, with reasonable assurance, not true.
In other words, if fi is not assigned to si, it will, with reasonable assurance, not be veriﬁed
4See §5.2.3 for discussion of examples where this collusion assumption (A1) may not hold.
5By reasonable, we mean to emphasize that our claim is relative to our threat model and assumptions (e.g., see
§5.2.3); we cannot claim absolute security (which we do not believe exists in the real world.
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as such. Equivalently, if fi is veriﬁed as assigned to si, it is, with reasonable assurance,
assigned to si. This establishes Lemma 1.
LEMMA 2. psBGPprovidesreasonableassuranceofIPpreﬁxaggregationveriﬁcation.
ProofOutline: Letfg beapreﬁxaggregatedbyASsx fromasetofroutes{mi=(fi,pi)|pi =
[si,...]} received by sx. psBGP requires that for fg originated by sx to be veriﬁed as
proper, sx must either own a preﬁx fx such that fg ⊆ fx (veriﬁed by Lemma 1), or pro-
vide evidence that sx has in fact received {mi} and fg ⊆ ∪{fi}. Valid digital signatures
from each AS on pi can serve as evidence that sx has received {mi} (see Proposition 4).
If fg ⊆ ∪{fi}, then sx aggregates fg properly. If sx cannot provide the required evidence,
sx’s aggregation of fg is veriﬁed as improper. This establishes Lemma 2.
PROPOSITION 5. psBGP provides reasonable assurance of IP preﬁx origination au-
thentication (G5), i.e., an AS si’s origination of a preﬁx f is, with reasonable assurance,
veriﬁed as proper if f is assigned to si or is aggregated properly by si from a set of routes
received by si.
Proof Outline: Lemma 1 allows preﬁx assignment veriﬁcation, and Lemma 2 allows preﬁx
aggregation veriﬁcation, thus establishing Proposition 5.
The above results (Propositions 1–5) establish the psBGP security properties, as sum-
marized by Theorem 1 (cf. §2.3).
THEOREM 1 (PSBGP SECURITY PROPERTIES). psBGPachievesthefollowingﬁvese-
curity goals: AS number authentication (G1), BGP speaker authentication (G2), data in-
tegrity (G3), AS PATH authentication (G4), and preﬁx origin authentication (G5).
5.2 Countering Selected BGP Threats
We ﬁrst considerhowpsBGP detectsfalse preﬁxoriginations,andnextdiscuss howpsBGP
reacts to possible new threats arising from proposed security mechanisms in psBGP itself.
We also discuss some attack scenarios which are not addressed by psBGP.
5.2.1 Detecting False Preﬁx Origin. We consider three cases in which an AS may
originate routes for a preﬁx which is actually assigned to another AS.
MALICIOUS ATTACK. A malicious AS may hijack a preﬁx from another AS to attract
its trafﬁc. An AS is considered malicious if one or more BGP speakers within that AS are
compromised,or the administrator in the AS that controls BGP software and conﬁguration
intentionally misbehaves. psBGP can detect preﬁx hijacking since a malicious AS will be
unable to obtain from its neighbors or a trusted authority (e.g., an RIR) endorsements for
the hijacked preﬁx.
ROUTER MALFUNCTION. A router may mistakenly deaggregate preﬁxes (e.g., due to
software problems) and announce more speciﬁc ones. Deaggregating another AS’s preﬁx
is referredto as foreigndeaggregation;deaggregatingone’s own preﬁx is referredto as self
deaggregation. Foreign deaggregation has the same external behavior as preﬁx hijacking,
and thus can be detected. Self deaggregationappears to be equivalentto the announcement
of a subset of the preﬁx assigned to an AS, and thus is treated as legitimate.
DATABASE MISCONFIGURATION. Many ISPs use automatic scripts to generate router
conﬁgurationsfroma centralizeddatabasecontaininginformationof preﬁxassignments. If
a preﬁx is erroneouslyentered into such database (e.g., due to human error), automatically
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generated conﬁgurations will instruct a router which might be functioning correctly to
originate a preﬁx which it is not authorized to announce.
Database misconﬁguration will not result in successful preﬁx hijacking if the erroneous
database is not used by any neighboring AS to generate its PAL. In other words, if the
information used by all endorsing ASes for generating PALs is independent of the mis-
conﬁgured database containing erroneous preﬁxes, origin of those preﬁxes will result in
veriﬁcation failures since there will not exist a preﬁx endorsementconsistent with the false
preﬁx assertion. However, an ISP may have multiple ASes and use a single centralized
database for generating both router conﬁgurations and PALs for its own ASes. Thus, it is
possible that an erroneouspreﬁx assertion made by one AS gets endorsementfrom another
AS owned by the same ISP. This scenario is addressed in psBGP with MultiASCerts (Sec-
tion 4.2). More speciﬁcally, an endorsement from si for a preﬁx assertion made by sj is
not used if both si and sj are owned by the same organization, in which case they should
both appear on a MultiASCert under a common organization.
5.2.2 CounteringFalse PALs. We now discuss howpsBGP reacts to erroneousPALs
that contain false assertions or endorsements. These might potentially introduce new vul-
nerabilities arising from the proposed enhancements, as a result of malice or human error.
ERRONEOUS PREFIX ASSERTIONS. An AS si erroneously asserting the ownership of a
preﬁx through its own PAL will not result in service disruption of the legitimate owner of
that preﬁx as long as none of si’s neighbors endorses its assertion.
ERRONEOUS PREFIX ENDORSEMENTS. An AS si erroneouslyendorsingsj fora preﬁx
which is not asserted by sj will not result in any service disruption since such an endorse-
ment will not be used by any AS when it veriﬁes sj’s preﬁx assertions. If si is the only
endorsing neighbor for sj, or more generally, ∀si ∈ N(sj), si issues (f0
j,sj)si inconsis-
tent with (fj,sj)sj, then (fj,sj)sj will be veriﬁed as improper by other ASes, even if it is
actually correct. This is the case when misbehaving ASes form a network cut from sj to
any part of the network. It appears difﬁcult, if not impossible, to counter such an attack;
however,we notethatevenifsucha denialofserviceattackcouldbeprevented,manyother
techniques beyond the control of BGP could also be used to deny the routing service of sj,
e.g., link-cuts [Bellovin and Gansner 2003], ﬁltering, or packet dropping. Note that a pre-
ﬁx assertion made by si about a remote AS sk, i.e., si / ∈ N(sk), will not be checked when
sk’s preﬁx assertions are veriﬁed because si is not a neighbor of sk. Thus, a misbehaving
AS is unable to mislead other ASes about the preﬁx ownership of a non-neighboringAS.
5.2.3 Limitations of psBGP. We now discuss some limitations of psBGP. First, it is
subject to human error if a psBGP-enabled AS si sets threshold βi=1 (e.g., during the
early stage of psBGP deployment on the Internet). For example, if an AS uses a common
database for generating BGP speaker conﬁguration and for issuing PALs, a preﬁx erro-
neously entered into such a database can result in service disruption. Second, psBGP is
subject to k-party collusion if βi=k≥2. Suppose βi=2 which is the recommended con-
ﬁguration (see §4.4.1) for each psBGP-enabled AS si. If an attacker controls two ASes
that are owned by two different organizations (i.e., they do not appear on a common Mul-
tiASCert), it is possible for the attacker to generate two erroneous yet consistent PALs.
This is equivalent to the case that the PALs issued by two different ASes are in fact based
on a single data source; thus corroborating these two dependent PALs does not yield ad-
ditional beneﬁt. As a result, psBGP security can be defeated. To successfully launch such
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an attack, an adversary needs to: a) set up two organizations and manage to obtain an
AS number from an RIR for each of them; b) compromise the private keys used by two
independent ASes for signing their PALs; or c) set up one organization and manage to
obtain an AS number from an RIR and compromise the private key used by another AS
for signing its PAL. We suggest that these attacks would present non-trivial (albeit not
insurmountable)practical difﬁculty to an adversary. Moreover,additional mechanisms can
be implemented to detect and mitigate the effect of these collusion attacks. For example,
one can implement a policy to favor a preﬁx endorsed by more ASes, or by an AS which
has been veriﬁed to hold a larger address space of that preﬁx. If a collusion attack does
indeed occur and is detected, this could be reﬂected within the rating system by lowering
the rating of the colluding ASes (giving them less credibility) with the intent of making it
harder for them to launch new attacks in the future.
6. OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS OF PSBGP
Here we analyze some operational and performance issues of psBGP.
6.1 Deployment Analysis of psBGP
We ﬁrst argue that the effort involved in deploying psBGP is reasonable (relative to alter-
natives), and next discuss incremental beneﬁts from psBGP deployment.
6.1.1 Reasonable Deployment Effort. To deploy psBGP, an AS needs to: upgrade its
BGP speakers to support psBGP; issue a single SpeakerCert for all of its own BGP speak-
ers and a unique SessionCert for each of them; distribute the corresponding private keys
securely to its speakers; and periodically issue an appropriate preﬁx assertion list (PAL).
Upgrading BGP speakers can be done in a similar manner as upgrading existing router
software, although this may require to add more memory (cf. §4.1.2 and §6.3.1). Issu-
ing a SpeakerCert (e.g., in X.509v3 format) requires some level of knowledge of public
key certiﬁcates. However, many people responsible for BGP operations might have al-
ready acquired similar knowledge, e.g., from the use of PGP [Zsako 1999]; in any case,
we acknowledge that additional effort will always be involved in setting up a new system.
For example, personnel familiar with PGP may still need to spend some time studying
the X.509v3 certiﬁcate format. Issuing a PAL requires carrying out a certain level of due
diligence (§4.1.1) in improving an AS’ conﬁdence in the preﬁxes assigned to a (typically)
small number of selected neighbors. We expect such effort is reasonable since two direct
neighbors usually have established service agreements allowing some level of direct inter-
action. Such effort is also justiﬁable (in our opinion) considering potential security beneﬁt
to the Internet as a whole. Overall, all of this work can be done independently by an AS
without requiring authorization from other ASes (e.g., an upstream ISP). In other words,
psBGP can be deployed from the bottom up, mirroring the growth model of the Internet.
6.1.2 Incremental Deployability. As with the deployment of almost any other large
scale security system, it is unrealistic to expect psBGP to be deployedby all ASes simulta-
neously, or to be deployed at different times but turned on at the same time. It is expected
that if adopted, a small number of ASes will deploy psBGP ﬁrst, then more and more
ASes will follow. It is desirable that those ASes deploying psBGP ﬁrst can achieve some
immediate beneﬁts to justify their investment before psBGP is widely deployed. Here we
analyze beneﬁts and constraints of psBGP deployment (β=1), assuming all certiﬁcates
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and PALs required for verifying a preﬁx origin are available to a psBGP-enabled AS (cf.
§4.1.2).
The ﬁrst AS adopting psBGP does not gain any immediate beneﬁt since none of the
other ASes speaks psBGP. The second AS adopting psBGP will have some beneﬁt col-
lectively with the ﬁrst psBGP-enabled AS if they are direct neighbors. In this case, one
psBGP-enabled AS (si) will likely prefer the route originated by the other (sj) over routes
originated by a non-psBGP enabled AS regarding a preﬁx assigned to sj (see §4.5). Since
si and sj are also directly connected, trafﬁc originated from si and destined to sj will
likely arrive at sj and not be attracted to another AS if everything else besides BGP also
works correctly. In the case that si and sj are not directly connected,i.e., connectedby one
or more non-psBGP enabled ASes, si will still likely prefer the route originated by sj over
an erroneous one by a non-psBGP enabled AS (see §4.5), resulting in containment of any
erroneous announcements. However, there is no assurance that trafﬁc destined to sj can
reach their ultimate destinations from si. This is because such trafﬁc must traverse through
non-psBGP enabled ASes (or unsecured zones), some of which could have poisoned rout-
ing tables and direct trafﬁc over incorrectpaths. Thus, security that can be achievedby two
remote psBGP enabled ASes is less than that achieved by two psBGP-enabled neighbors.
We say that one or more psBGP-enabled ASes with direct links among themselves form
a secure zone, and one or more non-psBGP enabled ASes with direct links among them-
selves form a nonsecure zone. Assume at one point, a number of ASes on the Internet have
deployedpsBGP. Thenthe Internetcanbeviewedto consistofa numberofsecureandnon-
secure zones. Since two directly connected secure or non-secure zones can always form a
larger secure or non-secure zone, a secure zone will always directly connect with nonse-
cure zones, and a non-secure zone can have only secure zones as its direct zone neighbors.
This implies that secure zones can always form a network cut for a nonsecure one. To this
end, we can draw two conclusions. (1) An AS improperly originating a route for a preﬁx
assigned to a psBGP-enabled AS will be contained once it reaches a secure zone. In other
words, if a misbehaving AS is within a secure zone, the erroneous route will be contained
immediately. If it is within a nonsecure zone, it will propagate within the nonsecure zone
and be contained once it reaches a secure zone. (2) An improper origination of a preﬁx
assigned to a non-psBGP enabled AS will be propagated (without detection by psBGP)
through all non-secure and secure zones, i.e., over the entire Internet.
It is clear from the above conclusions that preﬁxes assigned to a psBGP-enabled AS
are protected to a certain degree from being hijacked while there is no such protection for
non-psBGP enabledASes. While a psBGP-enabledAS might ﬁnd limited protectionwhen
the number of other psBGP-enabled ASes is small, the protection increases as this number
grows. As a starting point, it might be beneﬁcial for an organization which owns multiple
ASes (such as a large or even medium-sizedgovernment)to deploy psBGP so that a secure
zone can be formed within that organization.
6.2 Complexity Analysis of psBGP
Here we consider the computational complexity resulting from AS PATH veriﬁcation and
AS preﬁx graph related operations. The former involves computationally expensive oper-
ations such as digital signature generation and veriﬁcation, while the latter involves much
simpler (less costly but potential numerous) operations such as data structure insertion,
deletion, comparison, and query. We do not attempt to provide a detailed, mathematically
rigorous running-time analysis for psBGP operations, but rather to provide enough insight
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to allow ballpark estimates sufﬁcient to provide conﬁdence that computational costs of
psBGP are reasonable, and will not be a reason to avoid deploying psBGP.
6.2.1 Complexity of AS PATH Veriﬁcation. Let a be the average number of external
ASes with which a BGP speaker establishes BGP sessions, and b the average number of
ASes on an AS PATH. A psBGP-enabled BGP speaker needs to generate on average a
unique digital signatures (one per AS neighbor)for each BGP update message it sends to a
neighbors, and to verify on average b unique digital signatures (for maximal security, i.e.,
θ=1) for each BGP update message received (see Algorithm 3). Signature veriﬁcations
related to certiﬁcate revocation and certiﬁcate chains are ignored here.
6.2.2 ComplexityofASPreﬁxGraphOperations. LetnbethetotalnumberofASes on
the Internet, d the average number of AS neighbors, and h the average number of preﬁxes
assigned to an AS. Let x≤d be the average number of neighboring ASes whose preﬁx
assertions are endorsed by an AS, and y the average numberof preﬁxes endorsed by an AS
for each such neighbor. Accordingly, each AS on average has x endorsing neighbors.
Thus, each PAL (cf. §4.1) on average consists of: 1) h preﬁx assertions, one for each
assigned preﬁx; 2) y preﬁx endorsements for each endorsed neighbor (x of them), result-
ing in xy preﬁx endorsements in total; 3) d−x null preﬁx endorsements, one for each
non-endorsed neighbor. Assume there are z MultiASCerts. We next estimate the com-
putational costs of the construction, update, and query of an AS preﬁx graph in psBGP.
Note all operations mentioned here are simple database operations (e.g., comparison), not
computationally expensive operations such as digital signature generation or veriﬁcation.
1) Complexity of AS Preﬁx Graph Construction (Algorithm 4). For the ﬁrst pali re-
ceived from each AS on the Internet, an AS needs to update the APAS H(si) for
si (lines 6–13), resulting in h{1+d[2+xy(1+z+1+1)]} operations. In addition, an
AS also needs to update the APAS H(sj) for each of si’s endorsed neighbors sj
(lines 14–20), resulting in d{1+h[xy(1+z+1+1)+1]} operations. Thus, in total
2hdxyz+6hdxy+3hd+h+d operations are required for processing each pali, result-
ingin n(2hdxyz+6hdxy+3hd+h+d) operationsforconstructingacompleteAS pre-
ﬁx graph from n PALs.
2) Complexity of AS Preﬁx Graph Update (Algorithm 5). Consider the worst case that
an AS si issues a new pal0
i that is completely different from the existing pali, i.e.,
all of its preﬁx assertions and endorsements have changed. In Algorithm 5, lines 6–
7 result in h operations, lines 8–11 result in 5xy operations, lines 12–18 result in
5d operations, lines 19–25 result in h{1+d[xy(1+z+1+1)]+1} operations, and lines
26–31 result in d{xy[1+h(1+z+1+1)]} operations. Thus one update might require
in total 2hdxyz+6hdxy+dxy+5xy+3h+5d operations.
3) Complexity of AS Preﬁx Graph Query (Algorithm 6) When an AS receives a BGP
update message, it veriﬁes that the origin AS is allowed to announce the preﬁx by
comparingtheannouncedpreﬁxwiththehpreﬁxesassertedbytheoriginAS,resulting
in up to h operations for one preﬁx origin veriﬁcation.
6.3 Performance Analysis of psBGP
Here we present our preliminary estimation of memory, bandwidth, and CPU overhead,
and the analysis of certiﬁcate dynamics in psBGP. While rigorous study has been per-
formed by Aiello et al. [2003] on the preﬁx delegation stability on the Internet as a whole,
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and by Nicol et al. [2004] and Zhao et al. [2005b] on PKI impact on BGP security using
simulation, it is desirable to study certiﬁcate dynamics of a secure system and to project
certiﬁcate management overhead on a per-AS level. We use BGP data collected by the
RouteViews project [RouteViews 2005]. We retrieved one BGP routing table the ﬁrst day
of each month from January to August 2004. Despite known shortcomings including in-
completeness of the RouteViews data set, it is one of the most complete data repositories
publicly available, and has been widely used in the BGP community.
6.3.1 Memory Overhead. Four types of certiﬁcates, one AS preﬁx graph, and digitally
signedBGP updatemessages requirememorystoragefora BGP speakertosupportpsBGP.
We estimate the memory overhead for each type and then estimate the total. We omit the
memory requirement for storing SessionCerts since a BGP speaker only needs to store
them for a small number of direct neighbors (e.g., fewer than tens).
ASNUMCERTS AND SPEAKERCERTS. We observedin total 178846 ASes as of August
1, 2004. One ASNumCert is required per AS. In the worst case, an AS may need to store
the ASNumCert of every AS on the Internet; in this case, 17 844 ASNumCerts would be
stored. As with S-BGP and soBGP, psBGP recommends use of the X.509v3 certiﬁcate
structure due to wide industrial support. Assuming the average size of a certiﬁcate is 600
bytes [Kent2003]basedon1024-bitRSA keys, 10.5Mbytes ofmemorywouldbe required
for storing 17 844 ASNumCerts. The same holds for SpeakerCerts.
PALs AND MULTIASCERTS. The size of pali, issued by each AS si, is primarily
determined by the number of preﬁxes assigned to si, the number of si’s neighbors, and the
numberof preﬁxesassigned to each of si’s neighborsthat are endorsedby si. Figures 4-(a)
and (b) respectively illustrate the distribution of AS neighbors and AS preﬁx assignments,
based on the RouteView dataset in July 2004. We can see that while some ASes have many
neighbors, and some are delegated many preﬁxes, many ASes have only a small number
of neighbors and are delegated a small number of preﬁxes. On average, each AS has 4.2
neighbors and is delegated 9.1 preﬁxes. Assuming the average size of a PAL is 1024
bytes (600 bytes for an X.509v3 certiﬁcate plus 424 bytes for about 60 preﬁx assertions
and endorsements), 17.8M bytes of memory would be required to store 17 844 PALs, one
for each AS. For MultiASCerts, a BGP speaker needs to store one certiﬁcate for each
organizationwhich owns multiple ASes. Based on the data from Aiello et al. [2003], there
are 385 multi-AS organizationswhich in total own 1259 ASes. On average, each multi-AS
organization owns 3.3 ASes. Assuming the average size of a MultiASCert is 600 bytes,
0.226M bytes of memory are required by each AS for storing all MultiASCerts.
AS PREFIX GRAPH. Each AS must construct an AS preﬁx graph for preﬁx origin
veriﬁcation. MemoryrequiredforstoringanASpreﬁxgraphdependsonthedatastructures
being used. For simplicity, we use an adjacency list currently consisting of 17 844 entries,
one entry per AS. Each entry consists of a 16-bit AS number and two 32-bit pointers, one
pointing to a linked list of preﬁxes assigned to this AS and the other pointing to a linked
list of neighboring ASes. On average, each preﬁx linked list has 10 elements with each of
17 bytes and each neighboring AS linked list has 5 elements with each of 6 bytes. Thus,
each entry in the ﬁxed array on average consumes 210 bytes. In total, an AS preﬁx graph
requires 3.7M bytes memory (M=106), using these (non-optimized)data structures.
6AS numbers used by IANA itself for experimental purposes are not counted.
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Fig. 4. Distribution of AS Neighbors and Preﬁx Assignments
AS PATH DIGITAL SIGNATURES. Each BGP speaker must store digital signatures for
protecting the AS PATH in a BGP update message received from a direct neighbor, which
are estimated at 35M bytes per neighbor [Kent 2003]. While many BGP speakers have a
few neighbors, some at the Internet exchanges may have tens. Assuming an average of
4.2 neighbors, each BGP speaker would need 147M bytes memory for storing AS PATH
digital signatures.
ASNumCerts 10.5M Bytes
SpeakerCerts 10.5M Bytes
PALs 17.8M Bytes
MultiASCerts 0.2M Bytes
AS Preﬁx Graph 3.8M Bytes
AS PATH Digital Signatures 147.0M Bytes
Total 189.8M Bytes
Table III. psBGP Memory Requirements per AS
In summary, on average a total of 189.8M bytes of memory are required for storing
all certiﬁcates, an AS preﬁx graph, and digitally signed BGP update messages to support
psBGP (see Table III). While many BGP speakers may require less memory to support
psBGP, some would require signiﬁcantly more. We expect that routers will be equipped
with more memory over time, thus mitigating the hurdle of memory overhead.
6.3.2 Bandwidth Overhead. Except for a small number of public key certiﬁcates of
trusted CAs which may be distributed using out-of-bandmechanisms, all other certiﬁcates
inpsBGP canbedistributedwithBGPupdatemessages. Thelatterconsumesextranetwork
bandwidth. However, such overhead is not persistent since those certiﬁcates only need to
be distributed periodically or upon changes. We expect that such overhead is of little
signiﬁcance and do not discuss it further.
The primary bandwidth overhead is introduced by digitally signed data and signatures
carried by each BGP update message for protecting the message. For a fully protected
BGP route where every AS on the route digitally signs the update message, the overhead
is mainly determined by the number of such ASes, and could result in as much as 600%
overheadaccording to Kent [2003]. We expect no signiﬁcant difference between the band-
width overhead of psBGP and S-BGP. While increased bandwidth overheaddue to psBGP
( or e.g., S-BGP) is signiﬁcant in terms of percentage, as pointed out by Kent [2003], BGP
controlmessages only account for a small fraction of network bandwidthversus subscriber
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trafﬁc. Thus, from our preliminary analysis, we expect that bandwidth overhead of psBGP
will not create difﬁculty in the deployment of psBGP.
6.3.3 CPUOverhead. We expectthatCPU overheadofpsBGPwill mainlyresultfrom
AS PATH veriﬁcation, not AS preﬁx graph operations (cf. §6.2). A psBGP-enabled BGP
speaker needs to digitally sign each BGP update message sent to each neighbor, and to
verify some digital signatures carried by each BGP update message it receives and chooses
to use. As shown by Kent et al. [2000] in their study of S-BGP performance, such CPU
overhead is signiﬁcant. Especially in the case of reboots, a BGP speaker will receive full
routing tables from each of its neighbors, and thus must verify a large number of digital
signatures if psBGP is implemented. Note an AS preﬁx graph need not be rebuilt since it
canbestoredinpersistentstorageandreloadeduponreboot. psBGP providestheﬂexibility
for reducing the CPU overhead resulting from digital signature veriﬁcation by using a
lower conﬁdencethreshold,whichtrades off securityforefﬁciency. In otherwords, psBGP
providesa mechanismwhichallowsprotectionto beproportionallyachievedinaccordance
to the CPU powerwhicha routerhas available to spendonsignatureveriﬁcation. However,
to achieve higher level of assurance of AS PATH integrity, signiﬁcant CPU overhead will
be generated by psBGP. To mitigate the problem, various approaches might be helpful,
including caching [Kent et al. 2000], delay of signature veriﬁcation [Kent et al. 2000],
using a digital signature algorithm with a faster veriﬁcation operation (e.g., RSA) [Nicol
et al. 2004], and aggregated path authentication [Zhao et al. 2005a].
6.3.4 CertiﬁcateDynamics. ASNUMCERTS AND SPEAKERCERTS. Themonthlynum-
ber of ASes on the Internet has grown by an average of 190 since January 1, 2004, with an
average of 347 ASes added and 157 ASes removed (see Table II). When an AS number is
added or removed in psBGP, the corresponding ASNumCert must be issued or revoked by
an RIR. Thus, ﬁve RIRs between them must issue an averageof 347new ASNumCerts and
revoke an averageof 157 existing ASNumCerts per month. This appears quite manageable
in light of substantially larger PKIs existing in practice (e.g., see [Guida et al. 2004]). Note
the issuing and revocation of a SpeakerCert is performed by an AS, not an RIR.
PREFIX ASSERTION LISTS (PALS). A preﬁx assertion list pali must be changed (re-
moved, added, or updated) if: a) the AS number si changes (i.e., is removed or added); b)
an IP preﬁx assigned to si changes; c) si’s neighbor relationship changes, i.e., a neighbor
is removed or added; or d) an IP preﬁx changes which is endorsed by si for one of its
neighbors. Table IV depicts the dynamics of preﬁx assignments.
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul
Start of Month 148 903 148 014 151 174 156 019 157 925 160 818 155 118
Stable During Month 143 200 144 422 146 139 151 481 153 171 148 280 151 436
Stable During Jan-Jul 119 968 119 968 119 968 119 968 119 968 119 968 119 968
Removed During Month 5 703 3 592 5 035 4 538 4 754 12 538 3 682
Added During Month 4 814 6 752 9 880 6 444 7 647 6 838 10 360
Table IV. IP Preﬁx Dynamics from January 1 to August 1, 2004
We study the number of preﬁx assertion (PA) changes required for each AS based on
the two routing tables of July 1 and August 1, 2004. Each preﬁx addition or removal is
counted once (i.e., resulting in one PA addition or removal) if the AS number of the AS
owning that preﬁx does not change. If an AS number is newly added (or removed) during
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the month, all additions (or removals) of the preﬁxes owned by that AS are counted once
as a whole. One PA change usually represents one update to a PAL if such update is done
in a timely manner. However, an AS can choose to do multiple PA changes in one PAL
update (see §6.4 for more discussions).
Table V depicts the projected PA dynamics based on the data set of July 2004. The
total number of ASes observed during July 2004 is 18 048, including 17 884 observed on
August 1, 2004 and 164 removed during July 2004. We can see, the more ASes endorsing
an AS’s preﬁx assertions, the more PA changes required. We recommend the scenario
n = 2, where each AS has at most two endorsing neighbors even if it has more than two
neighbors. This provides a level of redundancy in the case that one of the two endorsing
neighbors fails to carry out adequate due diligence.
101- over
# of PA Changes 1 2-4 5-10 11-30 31-100 1000 1001 Total
n=1 # of ASes 1497 677 319 152 69 26 2 2742
(percentage) (8.3%) (3.8%) (1.8%) (0.8%) (0.3%) (0.1%) (0%) (15.2%)
n=2 # of ASes 1508 713 346 187 87 48 3 2892
(percentage) (8.4%) (4.0%) (1.9%) (1.0%) (0.5%) (0.2%) (0%) (16.0%)
n=3 # of ASes 1516 725 355 205 93 54 4 2952
(percentage) (8.4%) (4.0%) (2.0%) (1.1%) (0.5%) (0.3%) (0%) (16.4%)
n=all # of ASes 1424 784 387 233 112 53 30 3023
(percentage) (7.9%) (4.3%) (2.1%) (1.3%) (0.6%) (0.3%) (0.2%) (16.7%)
Table V. Projected number of ASes in absolute number, and as percentage of all ASes,
requiring the speciﬁed number of monthly preﬁx assertion (PA) changes in psBGP based
on July 2004 data. We recommend row n = 2 (n is the number of endorsing neighbors).
From Table V, in the recommended scenario n = 2, 16% of the ASes need to update
their PALs during the month. 8.4% of ASes need only one PA change in the month, 4%
need 2 to 4 PA changes, and 1.9% need 5 to 10 PA changes. However, a small number of
ASes need more than 100 changes, and AS 701 (UUNET) and its two endorsingneighbors
need around 5000 changes. We expect the number of PA changes will be lower in prac-
tice, since some of preﬁx changes observed through the RouteViews dataset might only be
temporary, and result in no changes to PALs.
6.4 Discussion
The timeliness of PAL updatesis importantto ensure serviceavailability. PALs needto be
updated and distributed in a timely manner so that preﬁx ownerships can be veriﬁed using
currently correct information. To ensure that an endorsing neighbor of a given AS updates
its PALs for that AS in a timely manner, a service agreement between them would likely
be required, e.g., as an extension to their existing agreements. Since there is usually some
time delay window before newly delegated preﬁxes are actually used on the Internet, an
endorsing AS should be required to update its PAL to include newly delegated preﬁxes of
an endorsed neighbor within that delay window. Updates of preﬁx removals can be done
with lower priority since they would appear to have only relatively small security impli-
cations. PALs along with other certiﬁcates (e.g., ASNumCerts and SpeakerCerts) can be
distributed with BGP update messages in the previously discussed new optional and tran-
sitive path attribute (see §4.1.2); thus, they can be distributed as fast as announcements of
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preﬁxesand areaccessible withoutanydependenceon BGP routes. Since those certiﬁcates
are not route speciﬁc, new rules are required to determine how often a certiﬁcate will be
included in an update message, e.g., on a daily basis or when a certiﬁcate is newly issued.
Another approach is to store those certiﬁcates in centralized directories [Kent 2003], and
to have each AS download them periodically, e.g., on a daily basis.
7. RELATED WORK
Considerable research has been published on securing routing protocols. Perlman [1988]
was among the ﬁrst to recognize and study the problem of securing routing infrastructures.
Bellovin [1989] discussed security vulnerabilities of Internet routing protocols as early as
1989(seealso[Bellovin2004]). Morerecently,BellovinandGansner[2003]discussedpo-
tential link-cutting attacks against Internet routing. Kumar and Crowcroft [1993]proposed
the use of digital signatures and sequence numbers for protecting the integrity and fresh-
ness of routing updates. For a thorough analysis of BGP vulnerabilities and protections,
see Murphy [2002b; 2002a].
The most complete and concrete security proposal to date for addressing BGP vulnera-
bilities is S-BGP [Kent et al. 2000; Seo et al. 2001]. It proposesthe use of centralized PKIs
for authenticating AS numbers and IP preﬁx ownership. S-BGP PKIs are rooted at RIRs,
and parallel to the existing system of AS numberassignment and IP address allocation. An
AS PATH is protected using nested digital signatures; its integrity is guaranteed.
soBGP [White 2003] proposes the use of a web-of-trust model for AS public key au-
thentication, and a centralized hierarchical model for IP preﬁx ownership veriﬁcation.
AS PATH is veriﬁed for plausibility by checking against an AS topology graph. Each
AS issues certiﬁcates listing all neighboring ASes. A global AS graph can be constructed
from those certiﬁcates. Thus, the existence of an AS PATH can be veriﬁed if all ASes on
the path have deployed soBGP. Table VI compares S-BGP, soBGP, and psBGP (recall §2.3
re: goals, also see §3.5 and Wan et al. [2007] for further backgroundinformation).
Goal S-BGP soBGP psBGP
G1: AS Number centralized decentralized centralized
Authentication (multiple levels) (with trust transitivity) (depth=1)
G2: BGP Speaker one certiﬁcate one certiﬁcate one certiﬁcate
Authentication per BGP speaker per AS per AS
G3: Data Integrity IPsec or TCP MD5 IPsec or TCP MD5 IPsec or TCP MD5
G4: Preﬁx Origination centralized centralized decentralized
Veriﬁcation (multiple levels) (multiple levels) (no trust transitivity)
G5: AS PATH Veriﬁcation full integrity plausibility stepwise integrity
Table VI. Comparison of S-BGP, soBGP, and psBGP re: achieving security goals of §2.3.
Goodellet al. [2003]proposeda protocolandarchitecture,Inter-domainRoutingValida-
tor (IRV), for improving the security and accuracy of BGP. Each AS builds an IRV server
which has the inter-domain routing information of that AS. One IRV can query another
IRV for non-authoritative routing information to verify BGP update messages received by
its hosting AS. Improperpreﬁxoriginationand AS PATH mightbe detectedby uncovering
inconsistenciesamongresponsesfromotherIRVs. One advantageofIRV is that it supports
incremental deployment requiring no changes to the existing routing infrastructure.
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Kruegel et al. [2003] propose a model of AS topology augmented with physical Internet
connectivity to detect and stop anomalous route announcements. Their approach passively
monitors BGP control trafﬁc, and does not require modiﬁcation to the existing routing
infrastructure. Therefore, it would appear to be easy to deploy.
In a rigorous study of preﬁx origination authentication, Aiello et al. [2003] formalize
the IP preﬁx delegationsystem, present a proofsystem, and proposeefﬁcient constructions
for authenticating preﬁx origination. Real routing information is analyzed and used to
reconstruct the IP delegation relationship over the Internet. They discover that the current
preﬁx delegation on the Internet is relatively static and dense, however they also note that
it is extremely difﬁcult, if not impossible, to determine this delegation structure.
Listen and Whisper [Subramanian et al. 2004] are proposed mechanisms for protect-
ing the BGP data plane and control plane respectively; they are best used together. The
ﬁrst approach (Listen) detects invalid data forwarding by detecting “incomplete” (as de-
ﬁned by Subramanian et al. [2004]) TCP connections. Whisper uncovers invalid routing
announcementsby detecting inconsistencyamong path signatures of multiple update mes-
sages, originating from a common AS but traversing different paths.
Hu et al. [2004] propose a Secure Path Vector (SPV) protocol for securing BGP. SPV
makesuse ofefﬁcientcryptographicprimitives,e.g.,authenticationtrees andone-wayhash
chains for protecting AS PATH, and is argued to be more efﬁcient than S-BGP; however it
suffers a signiﬁcant cost in increased memory (perhaps as much as 3-to-5 fold).
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Beyond AS PATH veriﬁcation in §3.5, it is desirable to verify if an AS PATH conforms to
the route exporting policies of each AS on the path. Since BGP is a policy-driven routing
protocol, each AS can individually decide whether or not a received route advertisement
shouldbe furtherpropagatedto a neighboringAS. Suchrouteexportingpolicies aremainly
deﬁned based on the business relationship with a neighboring AS. Without such veriﬁca-
tion, a misbehaving BGP speaker (e.g., misconﬁgured) may be able to re-advertise routes
which are prohibited by its route exporting policies. For example, a multihomed AS may
readvertise routes received from one provider AS to the other, thus functioning as a transit
AS for its two providers. Such misbehavior may allow for eavesdropping and may also
result in service disruption. New mechanisms for AS PATH veriﬁcation appear necessary.
Different approaches have been taken by S-BGP, soBGP and IRV, among other pro-
posals, for addressing security in BGP. We believe that psBGP adopts their best features,
while differing fundamentally with a novel approach taken to verify IP preﬁx assignments
and AS PATH integrity. As no centralized infrastructure for tracing changes in IP pre-
ﬁx assignments currently exists, and it would appear to be quite difﬁcult to build such
an infrastructure, we believe that the decentralized approach taken by psBGP provides a
more feasible means of increasing conﬁdence in correct preﬁx origin. We hope this work
stimulates consideration of alternate design choices and trust models for securing BGP.
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